UDC 355.02(430):327.56
Biblid: 0543-3657, 77 (2026)
Vol. 77, No 1197, pp. 413-446
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_ria.2026.77.1197.4

Review article
Received: 12 Feb 2026
Accepted: 13 May 2026
CC BY-SA 4.0

“ZEITENWENDE”: THE TRANSFORMATION OF GERMANY’S DEFENCE POLICY AFTER RUSSIA’S 2022 WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

OBRENOVIĆ Mile (Research Assistant, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Serbia), mile.obrenovic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

Former German Chancellor Scholz marked the Russian war against Ukraine in 2022 as a turning point (“Zeitenwende”), after which the international system would no longer be the same, as power gained primacy over law and war over peace. Without delving into whether the Russia–Ukraine war objectively represents a turning point in the international system or is merely a subjective perception formed within Germany, this paper aims to determine how Germany has adapted to these “new” circumstances. Since power and war have become central in this “new” international order, Germany’s response to these circumstances must be sought in the field of defence policy. This raises the question of whether the “Zeitenwende” can be considered a turning point in German defence policy? The assumption is that it does represent a turning point, as Germany, for the first time since the end of World War II, independently decided to rearm. The analysis of German defence policy prior to the “Zeitenwende” is based on an interactionist approach that combines structural and actor-centred perspectives. This framework makes it possible to explain both the marginalisation of the armed forces in the period preceding the “Zeitenwende” and the subsequent shift in which rearmament came to occupy a central position in defence policy by examining the dynamic interplay between structural constraints and the agency of key political actors.

Keywords: Defence policy; rearmament; Germany; Bundeswehr; Zeitenwende; structural approach; actor-centred approach.