

## THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL REMITTANCES FOR THE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY OF A LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY

Vladimir GREČIĆ<sup>1</sup>

*Abstract:* It is known that foreign remittances are current private transfers from migrant workers residing in the host country for more than a year to recipients in their country of origin regardless of their immigration status. Transfers of migrants are defined as their net income of which a portion is transferred from the host country to the country of origin at the time of migration. Compensation of employees is the income of migrants who have lived in the host country for less than a year. Remittances play an important role in the economic development of the countries of emigration, individual households and businesses. However, it is relatively unknown that non-monetary remittances are also of great importance for the migrant countries of origin. The author of this article is focused on the importance of non-monetary transfers, which are known in the literature as well as socioeconomic and cultural contribution. This article is based on the concept of Peggy Levitt (1998) non-monetary remittances as well as the expansion of social norms, practices and social capital to and from the countries of origin of migrants; which means that migration involves the flow of ideas, knowledge, identity, and cultural values.

The article claims that the attitudes of migrants in their relationship with other social institutions such as the family and the state, help to understand better the specific contexts within the country of origin that may perpetuate or interfere with the networks of migrants, including the rapid emergence and consolidation of new networks. The author claims that the diaspora and migrants can play a key role in the development of the home country by the presentation of its rich and diverse experiences. Engaging the Diaspora in the development of the home country largely depends on it. Talented people remain an important component of the country and the enterprise's long-term competitiveness. Therefore, special attention is paid to the role of highly skilled and highly educated migrants.

*Key words:* migration, monetary remittances, non-monetary remittances, knowledge diffusion, development, Serbia.

---

<sup>1</sup> Retired Professor of Labour Economics, University of Belgrade.

## INTRODUCTION

In the process of increasing economic interdependence and globalization across the world, the diasporas become a significant factor in the development. It is now widely acknowledged that as trans-nationalized individuals, groups and communities, the diasporas – with their accumulated financial resources, as well as acquired human and social capital – are capable of making significant contributions to the political and socioeconomic development of their home countries (African Diaspora Policy Centre, 2011). The diasporas can be an important source of trade, capital, technology and knowledge for the countries of origin and destination. International migration may be a powerful factor in the development process for both recipient and destination countries and opens up significant opportunities for the emigrants. In fact, the emigrants are the ones who benefit most from the process. When people are able to choose their place of residence with fewer restrictions, their human freedoms are increased, and they are allowed access, albeit selectively, to better living conditions (Alonso, 2011).

Recent research has shown that remittances play a huge role in developing countries' economy, individual households and businesses (Table 1). As for the remittances received, in addition to income from production, the households seek to spread these remittances across consumption and leisure. Otherwise, the reduction of steady labor supply in a country of origin leads to a decrease in income, but it is not enough to offset the additional resources from remittances. Therefore, the total household income increases in the presence of remittances which leads to an increase in the household in consumption, confirming the widespread belief that remittances help in poverty reduction and improves the living standard. According to the World Bank data, remittances are a more stable and reliable form of foreign exchange earnings in developing countries as compared to foreign direct investments (FDIs) or aid flows. They also serve to alleviate balance of payments and debt crisis that beset the economy of developing countries. In addition, remittances represent a potential stabilizing factor for the economy and financial development of the less developed countries. They also play a substantial part in the social aspect of the economic system, including education at all levels; they can allow for the payment of school and college fees and enable children to study at home and abroad.

Remittances are an important component of the local economy. They help individuals to invest in real estate sector, to invest in different kinds of equipment, to provide capital for starting new companies and embarking on entrepreneurial activities that could be seen as an improvement in the earning capacity of a migrant home country.

Therefore, remittances are very important and they involve large sums. According to the data of the World Bank (2018) “after two consecutive years of

decline, remittance flows to low and middle-income countries (LMICs) increased in 2017 by 8.5 percent, rising to \$466 billion<sup>4</sup>. Globally, remittances reached \$613 billion. Remittance flows rebounded in all regions in 2017: in Europe and Central Asia by 20.9 percent, in Sub-Saharan Africa by 11.4 percent, in the Middle East and North Africa by 9.3 percent, in Latin America and the Caribbean by 8.7 percent, in East Asia and the Pacific by 5.8 percent, and in South Asia by 5.8 percent.

Remittance flows to LMICs are projected to accelerate by 10.8 percent in 2018, to reach \$528 billion - a new record (World Bank, 2018a). Remittances are a major source of foreign exchange earnings in many LMICs and continue to be more than three times the size of official development assistance. According to the World Bank data, migrant remittances to Serbia increased in 2017 and 2018 by 12 and 26 percent, respectively, and reached \$4.5 billion in 2018 (Table 2).

According to a definition of Marko Pavlović (2017), migrant remittances are the monetary transfers made by migrants to their country of origin. Most remittances are personal cash transfers from a migrant worker or immigrant to a relative in the country of origin, but they can also be funds invested, deposited or donated by a migrant in the country of origin, or in-kind personal transfers and donations – transfers of skills and technology, as well as “social remittances”.

However, if we only focus on money at the expense of the people, objects, skills, and ideas that circulate within transnational social fields, our analysis of the migration – development nexus remains incomplete. Recognizing this, many scholars have taken up these facts and extended research on the importance of social remittances. The term “social remittances” was coined over fifteen years ago to capture the notion that, in addition to money, migration also entails the circulation of ideas, know-how, practices, skills, identities, and social capital also circulating between sending and receiving communities (Lacroix et al., 2016).

## **METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONS**

There are three main methods of data collection on social remittances (Helgesson Sekei et al., 2014): (a) a literature review; (b) an online survey; and (c) in-depth individual interviews.

For this article, the relevant data are collected from both national and international publications and statistical sources. It should be noted that social remittances are even less understood and studied, and even harder measurable.

In Serbia, the researchers faced enormous lack of data on its emigrants and the diaspora, relevant to quantitatively analyze the diaspora business and investment impact. “There is no system and database that is specific, simple and used by all the institutions tracking investments, employment based on investments, diaspora

investments and the developmental impact of investments (FDI and DDI) on the local and national level“ (Pavlovic, 2017).

As regards the number of migrants and members of the Serbian diaspora, researchers usually use statistics of the major immigration countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia, as well as the EU. Unfortunately, the statistics of these countries are not always clear or accurate when it comes to immigration from Serbia. The main reason for this is the disintegration of the country, an ongoing process that had several cycles. Until 1992, the Republic of Serbia was one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). During the period 1992–2006 Serbia went through several changes in its statehood status. After the disintegration of the SFRY in 1992, two former republics, Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In 2003, its statehood status changed once more with the formation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In June 2006, Montenegro became an independent state after a referendum, and Serbia likewise declared its independence on the 5 June 2006. In February 2008, Serbia’s Autonomous Province Kosovo and Metohija declared its independence. These changes in the statehood status of Serbia have resulted in some confusion in the immigration statistics of many countries.

Studies on the relationships between diasporas and development in Serbia tend to quantify this relation by focusing on the economic aspects of remittances and their effects on the macro and microeconomic levels. A few studies investigated the socio-cultural effects of migration and their societal impact. Mirjana Bobic (2009), among other things, wrote that it was the examination of new and more complex possibilities towards performing the closer ties of the homeland with key persons and groups that live abroad and possess significant assets (economic, cultural, social), who are also willing to contribute to country’s socioeconomic recovery, very important for Serbian society. The case of Serbia indicates that while the impact of financial remittances is positive, the impact of socio-cultural remittances is generally neglected.

Therefore, researchers should devote more effort to study the impact of socio-cultural remittances on Serbia. It is not enough to study only the flow of monetary remittances, but they should also pay more attention to the study of the impact of socio-cultural remittances which may play an important role, negative or positive, in reshaping societies (Zohry, 2017). Many migrants and returning migrants have gained knowledge and changed their attitudes and practices as a result of their exposure to other countries, and they are talking about their experiences to people in their community. These people are also human resources that can be used to spread information and make progress in terms of human development on issues such as education, health, livelihood, the environment or governance. They can be considered agents of change in society (Helgesson Sekey, 2014).

## **SOCIAL REMITTANCES AND SOCIAL CAPITAL – THEORETICAL CONCEPT**

Changes in political, social and economic contexts have drawn the attention of various non-state and state actors to the utility of remittances (Goldring, 2003). Governments even designed programs and policies to manage and attract remittances from successful migrants to enhance the entrepreneurial spirit and the welfare of communities of origin (Markley, 2011).

Peggy Levitt (1998) uses the term social remittances to describe the diffusion and circulation of different social practices and ideas into the migrants sending and migrants-receiving areas, which accompany the migration process. Noteworthy, while monetary remittances are usually conceived as unidirectional flows from host countries to the homelands of migrants, social and political remittances may be multi-directional (Goldring, 2003; Levitt and Lamba, 2011).

According to Mohamoud and Fréchaud (2006), social remittances represent ideas, practices, minds set, world views, values and attitudes, norms of behavior and social capital (knowledge, experience and expertise) that the diaspora mediates and transfers from host to home countries. There are at least four types of social remittances – normative structures, systems of practice, identities, and social capital (Levitt and Lamba, 2011). Peggy Levitt (2005) defined normative structures as “ideas, values and beliefs that include norms of behavior, notions about family responsibility, principles of neighborliness and community participation, and aspiration for social mobility“. They are related to ideas about gender, race, and class identity, principles and values of organizations, government and churches. Systems of practice are the actions shaped by normative structures. They encompass organizational practices, such as recruiting and socializing new members, goal setting and strategizing, establishing leadership roles, and forming interagency ties (Levitt, 2005). They also include how individuals delegate household tasks and how much they participate in political, religious and civic groups (Mohamoud and Fréchaud, 2006).

Eliza Markley (2011) is on the right track when she says “both values and norms on which social capital is based, and social capital itself were socially remitted“. Likewise, Bourdieu (1986), Putnam (1993, 2000) and Coleman (1988) understand social capital as a resource for collective action, consisting of social networks of civic engagement and associated norms that have an effect on the productivity of the community. A broader view of social capital includes the social and political environment that enables institutional norms to develop and shape the social structure (North, 1990). Social capital’s characteristics and its role in facilitating the circulation of values and norms between new lands and homelands have been described by Eliza Markley (2011). Features of social organisation are networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Putnam (1995: 67) compares social capital to physical and human capital: “Whereas

physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them“.

Levitt and Lamba (2011) argue that migrants’ experiences from their home countries have a strong influence on how they settle into the new culture which, in turn, affects what they subsequently remit back home. For this reason, social remittances have to be understood through a transnational perspective. They argue that only by looking at changes and effects of other remittances in the home and host countries will not reveal how or why values, norms and practices travel within the transnational social space created by migrants.

According to Eliza Markley (2011) findings, recent studies suggested that contemporary immigrants did not sever their relationships with the home country. On the contrary, they forge and sustain multiple linkages with it. However, Peggy Levitt (2005) argues that immigrants are better understood as transmigrants, persons who live their lives in a transnational social space, and according to Glick-Schiller et al. (1995) develop identities configured in relations to both home and host countries. That means twenty-first-century immigrants belong to two societies simultaneously (Levitt, 2005). They become incorporated into the institutions and patterns of the daily life of the country in which they reside. At the same time, yet, they maintain connections, build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence local and national events in the countries from which they migrated (Glick-Schiller et al., 1995).

It should be noted that because of the phenomenon’s vast expansion and tremendous complexity of modern diasporism, theories, analyses, and debates occur across various disciplines: law, political science, history, sociology, economics, philosophy, and anthropology. These debates concern almost every aspect of modern diasporism. The nature of diasporans’ identity is important.

Basically, now there are two theoretical approaches to current diasporism. One approach – which is called “Transnational Communities” - views diasporas as imagined transnational communities, espousing deterritorialized identities and robustly influenced by post-modern, globalized, hybridizing processes, and economic developments. The main argument of this school is that diaspora entities lose their ties to their homelands and exist as independent communities in the new global environment. The second approach argues that because of their inherent ethno-national identities and deeply rooted connections to a real or imagined homeland reflected in the profile presented above, most diasporas cannot be viewed as pure transnational entities (Sheffer, 2003).

According to the explanation of professor Gabriel Sheffer (2003), currently, there is a growing awareness and understanding that diasporas are neither purely “imagined” nor utterly “constructed” communities. This is due to the fact that

diasporas' identities are intricate combinations of non-essentialist primordial, psychological/mythical, and instrumental elements. Over time the cultural and social identities of these entities may undergo certain adaptations to changing circumstances in both their hostlands and homelands, but the basic elements in their ethno-national identity remain intact. The most important facts are that ethno-national trans-state diasporas are not going to disappear in the foreseeable future, that their impact on almost all homeland and hostland societies and states is increasing, and that these developments occur despite hostility toward them and despite the fact that they are not dangerous entities. On the contrary, diasporas positively contribute to their hostlands and homelands (Sheffer, 2003).

Not all of the ideas and practices migrants send back to their homelands are well received. Much work suggests that social remittances shake up gender and generational dynamics in ways that benefit women (Levitt, P. and D. Lamba-Nieves, 2010). Social remittances can also challenge people's ideas about democracy and the rule of law. Finally, hi-tech professionals and entrepreneurs from developing countries not only send back new technology and skills but ideas about conducting business.

According to Orozco-Rouse (2007) findings, for many migrants, their first priority is staying connected to families and friends left behind. They do so by calling relatives, visiting home, and sending remittances. Emotional connections with the homeland are not limited to family ties, and migrants may also maintain their cultural identities by patronizing migrant businesses or purchasing nostalgic products from their countries of origin, such as tortillas, rum or spices. Social remittances are also harnessed collectively. Hometown associations (HTAs) allow immigrants from the same city or region to maintain ties with and materially support their places of origin. Therefore, a special type of diaspora engagement -hometown associations, also known as HTAs — are organizations that allow immigrants from the same city or region to maintain ties with and materially support their places of origin. At the same time, HTAs create a new sense of community among recent immigrants with similar backgrounds. They also represent a transnational identity rooted as much in the migrants' country of origin as in the migrants' adopted home (Orozco-Rouse, 2007). Members of the Serbian diaspora have not organized their HTAs so far.

Peggy Levitt and D. Lamba-Nieves (2011) suggest directions for future research. They propose that in order to help policymakers concerned about development, researchers need to uncover what determines how ideas and values travel and under what circumstances idea change contributes to behavioral and institutional change. Another question to resolve: when does local-level change in something like gender relations, for example, scale up to produce broader shifts in reproductive behavior and labor market participation? Scholars and practitioners either focus on what happens to immigrants once they arrive in a new place or what happens in the places where they come from. This artificial separation does not reflect migrants'

lives, nor does it allow policymakers to respond creatively to the challenges migrants face. Migration research needs to span migrants' origin and destination countries and go beyond economic considerations to include the social and cultural migration (Levitt, P. and D. Lamba-Nieves, 2011). The "migration-development nexus" perspective (de Haas, 2010; Kapur, 2010) or "migration-development inter-linkages" (Katseli, Lucas, & Xenogiani, 2006) are hardly appropriate for studying the social and cultural effects of migration within the enlarged EU.

### **SOME RESEARCH FINDINGS IMPORTANT FOR A LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY**

The literature elucidates the complex relationship between the social infrastructure of transnational connections, remittances and their political implications. Scholars debates were in several ways: (1) by piloting innovative, interdisciplinary methods that reveal the role of networks in cultural circulation; (2) by bringing to light the legal and socioeconomic factors affecting *who* transfers what; (3) by beginning to untangle the complicated relationship between social remittance transfers and broader inequalities; (4) by explanation what contributes to social remittances' scaling up and out; and (5) by calling into question some of the epistemological assumptions underlying migration studies and the social sciences in general (Lacroix et al., 2016).

So far, transfers of norms have been found in various fields (Gubert, 2018): (a) health (with impact found on fertility); (b) family and gender issues (on the position and role of women); (c) political sphere (with changes in political attitudes between migrants and their left-behinds, higher demand for political accountability, etc.).

How to actively engage the diaspora in supporting the institutional and policy changes in Serbia remains a key question. The diaspora needs to be engaged to move its activities to Serbia, that is, its production and operations. When "landing" in Serbia, its interest will be to show all the potential and capacities the Serbian market and the economy have and need. This process is currently underway in Serbia, but not enough to bring about a substantial "developmental push". The country needs a developmental push forward from the private sector, from the innovative, technology-driven, business-driven diaspora enthusiasts coming home (Pavlović, 2017). One of the key issues in engaging the Serbian diaspora is the lack of understanding of the diaspora as an individual and collective actor, and differentiating the diaspora from the regular foreign investors, business and education actors. By assessing the empirical evidence, Pavlović (2017) has identified the diaspora's developmental role. The returning diaspora and transnational companies (home and away) are pushing for a strong change in the domestic economy. Overachieving returnees have a clear goal in developing their companies based on the pillars of knowledge learned abroad. Usually, they build companies

step by step, from a group of returnees or a group of pioneers. The thing that is specific to these companies is the pattern of fast expansion. In a couple of years, a very large percentage of these companies expands drastically and becomes successful (Pavlović, 2017).

The strategy of preserving and strengthening the ties of the home country and the diaspora, as well as the home country and Serbs in the region from 2011 has opened the possibility of engaging the diaspora in the transfer of knowledge, with the aim of learning from scientists from abroad and transforming the home country. However, action plans for each of these areas have not yet been developed. What we are missing in this is a creative strategic approach. Still no answer to the question of how the diaspora could be connected and coordinated with institutions (government support), business (capital) and universities (knowledge) that allow the creation of a competitive economy and the modern state. This certainly affects the process of connecting and cooperation between the home country and its diaspora.

Considering the possibilities of hiring talents from abroad for the overall development of Serbia, there were several conclusions. First, the time in which we live implies the necessity of engaging career accomplished and talented people from abroad (overachievers) to accelerate economic, social and cultural or any other development in Serbia. In order to realize this need, it is necessary to create a favorable environment for such developments - as voluntary “migrations are the cause and consequence of globalization, and its effects on the country of origin depend on internal factors in the home country” - by building relevant capacity to attract talents. Second, without the proper functioning of the competent state institutions, it is hardly possible to ensure the success of any joint project of the diaspora and the mother country. On the other hand, the civil sector and the media should have a significantly greater role in attracting talents from abroad to the home country. Third, the competent national authorities should initiate the creation of cooperation projects of the home country and the diaspora, since they have the best insight into the needs and scarce capacity for the development of Serbia. Fourth, the science and technology parks (STPS) of Serbia have a reasonable chance of a significant shift in the initiation and implementation of joint projects, STPS workers and their counterparts from the creative diaspora. After a long waiting, Science and Technology Park in Belgrade published a call for members of the Serbian scientific and technological Diaspora, inviting experts, primarily from the IT sector, but also from other areas for cooperation (details, <https://ntpark.rs/>).

Executive power in Serbia should reconsider its policy of institutional capacity building related to the promotion of cooperation with the Diaspora, to evaluate their effectiveness and to create new forms of engagement and methods suitable for building closer ties with the Diaspora in today's global society. The competent authorities should pay greater attention to the academic, professional and

entrepreneurial networks and associations in the Serbian diaspora to encourage their self-organization and cooperation with the mother country. Strategy for Cooperation with Diaspora should be adequately implemented and where needed upgraded to increase the contribution of the Diaspora intellectual development of their home country.

In Serbia, there is no sufficiently developed awareness of the importance and potential of the Serbian Diaspora, not only among ordinary citizens but also with the authorities. The policy towards the diaspora includes the harmonization of the various aspects of development and conflicting motives contained in the programs of relevant ministries. Expedient resolution of such conflicts requires a political will and commitment. Key assumptions necessary for the acceptance and implementation of the concept of a new policy towards the Diaspora, as well as for the successful achievement of the concept is a broad political and social consensus. In addition, strong political will and public support are the most immediate success factors.

Therefore, special attention and adequate activities of public authorities, businesses - especially chambers of commerce, as well as the media, is needed to raise awareness among the people but also in the executive and legislative authorities that without investment in research and development and in innovation in all fields and even in politics, there is neither progress nor increase of the competitiveness of the Serbian economy.

Therefore, international migration can improve institutions through several direct and indirect channels: (i) the transfer of political norms; (ii) voting from abroad; (iii) financial remittances; (iv) return migration; and (v) lobbying activities from abroad (Lodigiani, 2016). At the macro level, recent key studies consider the overall impact of emigration on institutional quality and discuss the possible effects through which emigration may affect institutions in the home country, but without disentangling those effects. In contrast, the micro literature focuses on one specific country and investigates more thoroughly the channels through which emigration may affect institutions (Lodigiani, 2016).

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

Remittances are not the only channel through which migration affects development. Less obvious are the social remittances that migration brings by increasing trade flows and facilitating the transfer of skills, knowledge, values and innovation (United Nations, 2012). Diaspora groups, often consisting of several generations of migrants, can be particularly effective due to their connections to and knowledge of both sending and receiving countries. Furthermore, migrants play a key role in promoting economic dynamism in the countries in which they

work, often filling labour and skill gaps. In the light of demographic changes in much of the industrialized world, the role of migrants will become increasingly important to fill specialized high-skill positions, as well as meet additional labour needs, for instance in the health and human care sectors. Furthermore, some research suggests migrants may have more “entrepreneurial spirit” than native-born. While the emigration of highly skilled workers (often referred to as “brain drain”) can have negative implications for the development efforts of small developing economies, particularly in crucial sectors such as health and education, recent research has shown that the migration of highly skilled workers can have benefits for both sending and receiving countries, even more so with effective policy measures and enabling environments (United Nations, 2012).

There is evidence that emigrants from the developing world do affect the economic, political, and social institutions in their home countries. Emigrants can directly affect the political institutions in their home country without returning home (Landgrave and Nowrasteh, 2016). Improved institutions can help jump-start economic growth in poor countries. Emigration can improve the quality of political institutions in origin countries through several channels. The first is by encouraging domestic elites to liberalize institutions to retain skilled workers. The second is by easing the international flow of ideas through social remittances and direct engagement by return migrants (Landgrave and Nowrasteh, 2016). In other words, the existing literature shows the importance of international migration acting as a political agent working to shape institutions in the country of origin. Whereas macro studies show the positive global effect of emigration, micro studies try to disentangle the channels through which migrants can become important in shaping political outcomes in the place of origin. Even if more research is needed to clarify the mechanisms and effects of international migrants on political outcomes at home, it is recognized that they could be important agents of democratization (Lodigiani, 2016).

Thus, policymakers should take into account that migration policies, both at the origin and the destination, may promote the role of migrants as transnational political agents. Home countries can favor migrants’ political participation by allowing external voting. At the same time, host countries can help to support the organization of external voting. International organizations could also play an important role in implementing voting programs from abroad, especially following post-conflict elections (Lodigiani, 2016).

The Serbian practice of engaging the diaspora needs to move beyond the weak institutional context (a chronic lack of finances, specialized employees focused especially on engaging the diaspora, supporting events and institutional cooperation). An integral framework allowing for the cumulative action, efficiency and success of all the institutional actors from embassies to local municipalities would be an important step forward (Pavlović, 2017).

The main pillars of the long-term development of Serbia should be: (a) *better use of talents*: retention of professionals in the country and attracting talents from abroad who are carriers of innovation and contribute to increasing competitiveness; (b) *adequate institutions*: completion of building institutions that will ensure the realization of the objectives of the Europe 2020; (c) *adequate human capital management*: extension and implementation of the strategy of cooperation with the Diaspora and development of concrete cooperation projects “at a distance”. From the profiled and competent experts in the Diaspora is expected that, in addition to knowledge, they bring to the home country “entrepreneurial spirit, contacts and initiative.” Creation of a powerful diaspora “searching network” requires time, patience and institutional capacity.

Generally speaking, each member of the Serbian diaspora is undoubtedly important for their home country. However, when it comes to development, especially economic, and in the area of cooperation with the Diaspora, innovators who are holders of technology development which increases the productivity and competitiveness of any economy, are a special target group for decision-makers in Serbia who should be more serious regarding overachievers from the diaspora. The success of the cooperation between the intellectual diaspora and the home country largely depends on the home country, its will, commitment and adequate measures to promote such cooperation.

### BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

- Alexander, J. and Smith, P. (2003). “The Strong Program in Cultural Sociology: Elements of a Structural Hermeneutics”. In J. C. Alexander (ed.) *The Meanings of Social Life*, New York: Oxford University Press, 11-26.
- Beaton, Kimberly, Cevik Serhan and Seyed Reza Yousefi (2017), „Smooth Operator: Remittances and Fiscal Shocks“, *IMF Working Paper* WP/17/165, July.
- Bobić, Mirjana (2009), „Dijaspora kao ekonomski i socijalni kapital Srbije“, *Sociološki pregled*, vol. XLIII, No. 3.
- Boxman, E., De Grant, P., & Flap, H. (1991). „The Impact of Social and Human Capital on the Income Attainment of Dutch Managers“. *Social Networks*, 13: 51-73.
- Boyarin, J. (1994). “Space, time, and the politics of memory” In: J. Boyarin (ed.) *Re-mapping Memory: The Politics of Time-Space*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1-37.
- Castles, S. and Delgado Wise, R. (eds.) (2008). *Migration and Development: Perspectives from the South*. Geneva: International Organization on Migration (IOM).
- Coleman, J. S. (1988). „Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital“. *The American Journal of Sociology*. 94, S95-S120: 376.

- Cwerner, S. (2001). "The times of migration". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27(1): 7-36.
- Dannecker P. (2009). "Migrant visions of development: a gendered approach". *Population, Space and Place*, 15: 119–132.
- De Haas, H. (2008). *Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective*. International Migration Institute Working Paper No. 9. Oxford: James Martin 21st Century School, University of Oxford.
- Delgado Wise, R. and Márquez Covarrubias, H. (2010). "Understanding the relationship between migration and development: Toward a new theoretical approach". In N. Glick Schiller, and T. Faist (eds.) *Migration, Development, and Transnationalization*, Oxford: Berghan Books.
- Elchardus, M., Glorieux, I. and Scheys, M. (1987). "Temps, culture et coexistence". *Studi Emigrazione*. 24(86): 138-54.
- Gasparini, G. (1994). "Les cadres temporelles des sociétés post-industrielles". *Social Science Information/Information sur les Sciences Sociales*. 33(3): 405- 25.
- Glick Schiller, N., Basch, L., Blanc, C. S.(1995). „From immigrant to transmigrant: Theorizing transnational migration“, *Anthropological Quarterly*. 68: 48–63.
- Glick Schiller, N.(1999). „Terrains of blood and nation: Haitian Transnational Social Fields“. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 22: 340–366.
- Glick Schiller, N. and Faist, T. (eds.) (2010). *Migration, Development, and Transnationalization*. Oxford: Berghan Books.
- Goldring, L.(2003). *Re-thinking remittances: Social and political dimensions of individual and collective remittances*, Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean, available online at <http://www.yorku.ca>.
- Goldring, L. (2004). "Family and collective remittances to Mexico: A multi-dimensional typology". *Development and Change*, 35: 799–840.
- Grabowska I., Garapich M.P., Jazwinska E., Radziwinowicz A. (2017). *Migrants as Agents of Change. Social remittances in an enlarged European Union*. Basingstoke, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gomez, E. T., Benton, G.(2002). „Transnationalism and the essentializing of capitalism: Chinese enterprise, the state and identity in Britain, Australia, and Southeast Asia“. *East Asia*, 20: 3–28.
- Grečić, V. (2013). *The Serbian Academic Diaspora*. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics.
- Grečić, V. (2016). "How can the Serbian diaspora contribute much more to the development at home country". *Glasnik srpskog geografskog društva*. 96 (2): 65-82.

- Gubert, Flore (2018). „Migration, remittances and development: African perspective“. *Improving Migration, Remittances and diaspora data: SDGs and the Global Compact on Migration*. Paris, January 16th (International Conference).
- Helgesson Sekei, Linda, Annette Altvater, Jacob Charles Mrema, and Adelaide Kisinda (2014). *Sending ideas back home: Exploring the potential of South–South social remittances in the United Republic of Tanzania*, Brussels: ACP Observatory on Migration.
- Helliwell, C. and Hindess, B. (2005). “The temporalizing of difference”. *Ethnicities*, 5: 414–418.
- International Organization on Migration (IOM) (2011). *Facts & Figures*. Available at: <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/facts-and-figures/lang/en> (accessed 22 December 2011).
- Kapoor, Riya (2017). *Latest Report Study on Global Remittance Market: Industry Analysis & Outlook (2015-2020)*, available at: <http://www.marketreportsonline.com/contacts/purchase.php?name=576544>. (retrieved on 24 October 2017).
- Lacroix, Thomas, Peggy Levitt and Ilka Vari-Lavoisier (2016). „Social remittances and the changing transnational political landscape“. *Comparative Migration Studies*. 4:16.
- Landgrave, M. and Nowrasteh, A. (2016). “Voice, Exit, and Liberty: The Effect of Emigration on Origin Country Institutions“. Cato Institute – *Economic Development Bulletin*. No. 25.
- Levine, R. (1997). *A Geography of Time*. New York: Basic Books.
- Levitt, Peggy (1998). „Social remittances: migration driven local-live forms of cultural diffusion“. *International Migration Review*. 23(4): 926–48.
- Levitt, P. (2001). *The Transnational Villagers*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Levitt, P., Glick Schiller, N. (2004).: Conceptualizing simultaneity: A transnational social field perspective on society“. *International Migration Review*. 38: 1002–1039.
- Levitt, P. (2007). *God Needs No Passport*. New York: The New Press.
- Levitt, P. and Lamba-Nieves, D. (2011). “Social Remittances Revisited”. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 37(1): 1-22.
- Levitt, Peggy and Deepak Lamba-Nieves (2013). „Rethinking social remittances and the migration-development nexus from the perspective of time“. *Migration Letters*, 10 (1): 11–22.
- Lodigiani, E. (2016). “The effect of emigration on home-country political institutions“. *The IZA World of Labor*. November, available at <https://wol.iza.org/articles/effect-of-emigration-on-home-country-political-institutions/long>.

- Markley, Eliza (2011). „Social Remittances and Social Capital: Values and Practices of Transnational Social Space“. *Quality of Life Journal*. 4: 366–378.
- Massey, D. S. (1987). „The social process of international migration“, in „Science”. 237: 733–738.
- Massey, D. S. (1988). *Economic development and international migration in comparative perspective*, in „Population and Development Review”. 14: 383–413.
- Mazzucato, V. (2011). „Reverse remittances in the migration–development nexus: Two-way flows between Ghana and the Netherlands”. *Population, Space and Place*. 17(5): 454–468.
- Orozco, Manuel and Rebecca Rouse (2007). *Migrant Hometown Associations and Opportunities for Development: A Global Perspective*. Migration Policy Institute. February 1, available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migrant-hometown-associations-and-opportunities-development-global-perspective> (retrieved on 24 October 2017).
- OECD (2018). *International Migration Outlook 2017*. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- Pavlović, Marko (2017). *Assessment National Investment Framework for Diasporas in the Republic of Serbia*. Belgrade: UNDP.
- Petit, V. (2007). „Migrations internationales de retour et pays d’origine“. *Les collections du Centre de Population et Développement*. Paris, pp. 57–85.
- Piore, M.J. (1979). *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Piper, N. (2009). „The complex interconnections of the migration and development nexus: A social Perspective”. *Population, Space, and Place*. 15(2): 93–101.
- Putnam, R. D. (1995). „Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital“. *Journal of Democracy*. 6(1): 65–78.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Raghuram, P. (2009). „Which migration, what development?: Unsettling the edifice of migration and development”. *Population, Space and Place*. 15(2): 103–117.
- Rahman, M. (2009). „Temporary migration and changing family dynamics: Implications for social development”. *Population, Space and Place*. 15 (2): 159–172.
- Roberts, B.R. (1995). „Socially expected durations and the economic adjustment of immigrants”. In: Portes, A. (ed.). *The Economic Sociology of Immigration: Essays on Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 42–86.
- Sheffer, G. 2003. *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, M.K. (2009). Social capital. Retrieved 3 April 2011, from <http://infed.org/mobi/social-capital/>.

- Sorokin, P. (1964). *Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time*. New York: Russel & Russel.
- Taylor, J. E. (1986). Differential migration, networks, information and risk, in Stark, O. (ed.). *Research in human capital and development: Migration, human capital, and development*, Greenwich. JAI Press, pp. 147–171.
- Terrazas, A. (2011). *Migration and Development: Policy Perspectives from the United States*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Tilly, C. (2007). „Trust networks in transnational migration“. *Sociological Forum*. 22: 3–24.
- Therborn, G. (2003). “Entangled modernities”. *European Journal of Social Theory*. 6: 293–305.
- United Nations (2013). *International Migration Policies: Government Views and Priorities*. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division ST/ESA/SER.A/342.
- United Nations (2015). *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision*. United Nations Database. POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015.
- United Nations (2012). *Realizing the Future We Want for All: Report to the Secretary-General*. Report by the United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda. United Nations. New York. Available from [www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Post\\_2015\\_UNTTreport.pdf](http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Post_2015_UNTTreport.pdf).
- United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2012). *The Least Developed Countries Report 2012: Harnessing Remittances and Diaspora Knowledge to Build Productive Capacities*. Geneva: UNCTAD.
- World Bank (2018). *Migration and Remittances. Recent Developments and Outlook*. Special Topic: Transit Migration. Washington, D.C. April.
- World Bank (2018a). *Migration and Development Brief 30*, Washington, D.C. December.
- Zerubavel, E. (1981). *Hidden Rhythms. Schedules and Calendars in Social Life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Zohry. Ayman (2017). “Non-monetary Remittances of Egyptians Abroad“. *Remittances Review*. 2 (1): 23-29.

**Annex**

*Table 1: Possible effects of brain drain on (developing) home countries*

<b>Effect types/ Processes</b>	<b>Adverse</b>	<b>Beneficial</b>
Knowledge and human capital	Shrinking human capital base	Brain gain
	Less innovation	Transfer/sharing of skills/technology
	Negative impacts on various, especially health and education	Diaspora knowledge networks
	Brain waste	Accumulation of broader/deeper knowledge/skills/experience
Macroeconomic Processes	Slower economic growth	Returnee entrepreneurship
	Declining high-skill labour Externalities	
	Lower productivity growth	
	Less entrepreneurship	
	(Fiscal) cost of educating highly skilled persons	
Flows Trade/capital	Changing relative resource endowments away from skills	Remittances
		Diaspora savings: bonds, deposits, loans, funds, etc.
		Diaspora effects and business networks
		Creation/strengthening of business flow: merchandise and services (e.g. tourism)
		Creation/strengthening of businesses funded through foreign direct investment
Institutional Processes	Lower supply of/demand for institutions	Diaspora assistance in/pressure for institution-building
		Returnee supply of/demand for Institutions

Source: Helgesson Sekei, et al., 2014: 21; UNCTAD, 2012.

*Table 2. Migrant Remittance Flows to and from Serbia, 2007-2017 (US \$ million)*

	Migrant remittance inflows	Migrant remittance outflows
2007	3,765	129
2008	3,544	180
2009	4,648	153
2010	4,118	155
2011	3,960	204
2012	3,549	218
2013	4,025	255
2014	3,696	267
2015	3,371	245
2016	3,205	239
2017	3,587	273
2018(a)	4,552	...
Total 2007-2018	46,020	2,318

(a) Estimate

*Source:* World Bank, Annual remittance data (updated as of December 2018).- estimate online.

## **ZNAČAJ NE-MONETARNIH MIGRANTSKIH DOZNAKA ZA PRIVREDU I DRUŠTVO JEDNE MANJE RAZVIJENE ZEMLJE**

*Apstrakt:* Poznato je da devizne doznake predstavljaju tekuće privatne transfere od radnika migranata koji žive u zemlji domaćinu više od godinu dana, bez obzira na njihov imigracioni status, primaocima u svojoj zemlji porekla. Transferi migranata se definišu kao neto zarade migranata čiji se deo prenosi iz zemlje prijema u zemlju porekla u vreme migracija. Nadoknada zaposlenima je prihod od migranata koji su živeli u zemlji domaćinu manje od godinu dana. Doznake igraju važnu ulogu u privrednom razvoju emigracionih zemalja, kod individualna domaćinstva i preduzeća. Međutim, manje je poznato da su ne-monetarne doznake od velike važnosti za zemlje porekla migranata. Središte pažnje autora ovog članka je usmereno na važnost ne-novčanih transfera, koji su poznati u literaturi kao socio-ekonomski i kulturni doprinos. Ovaj članak se oslanja na koncept Peggy Levitt (1998) ne-monetarnih doznaka kao širenje društvenih normi, prakse i društvenog kapitala prema i iz zemalja porekla migranata; što znači da migracija podrazumeva i protok ideja, znanja, identiteta, i kulturnih vrednosti.

U članku se tvrdi da će stavovi migranata u njihovom odnosu sa drugim društvenim institucijama, kao što su porodica i država, pomoći da se bolje razumeju specifični konteksti u okviru zemlje porekla koji mogu ovekovečiti ili ometati mreže migranata, uključujući i brzu pojavu i konsolidaciju novih mreža. Autor tvrdi da bi dijaspora i migranti mogli da igraju ključnu ulogu u razvoju zemlje, stavljanjem u službu matičnoj državi svoja bogata i različita iskustva. Angažovanje dijaspore u razvoju matične države u velikoj meri zavisi od nje same. Talenti ostaju kao važna komponenta za zemlju i preduzeća u pogledu dugoročne konkurentnosti. Stoga, posebna pažnja je posvećena ulozi visoko-obučanih i visokoobrazovanih migranata.

*Ključne reči:* migracije, novčane doznake, ne-monetarne doznake, difuzija znanja, razvoj, Srbija.

*Received: 12 March 2019*

*Accepted: 4 April 2019*