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## **CULTURAL DIPLOMACY – THE INSTRUMENT OF POWER IN AMERICAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY**

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*Abstract:* The present article is based on the premise that cultural diplomacy has mainly been used and perceived as instrument of public diplomacy, while relationship between cultural diplomacy and foreign and security policy of a state has not received much scholarly attention. The goal of the article is *to conceptualize cultural diplomacy as an instrument of foreign and security policy of a state, and to assess the normative role of cultural diplomacy in foreign and security policy of the USA from the end of the Cold War until today.* Empirical part of the paper is based on content analysis of American national security documents, with emphasis on the role of cultural diplomacy. Contemporary states strive for a successful and efficient realization of their developmental, foreign policy and security strategies by reaching synergy of their social, material, cadre, moral, foreign policy and security capabilities through cultural diplomacy. The complexity of present threats in international environment requires from states a more active engagement of cultural diplomacy as a means of cooperative provision of peace and security in international community.

*Key words:* cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, soft power, national security, national security strategy.

### **INTRODUCTION**

*“Public Diplomacy today is inextricably linked to national security - it is a critical part of 21<sup>st</sup> century statecraft, because how safe we are at home and abroad is a reflection of a global community’s shared interests and values that lead to a common understanding of shared burdens and responsibilities.”* Tara Sonenshine, 2011.

Changes in international security environment from the end of the Cold War to the present have dramatically impacted on the role of the State in international environment and its policies (in particular foreign and security policy), and have triggered a reconceptualization of security. Security has become related to societal

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value system and multilayered in its meaning. Wolfers emphasizes two sides of security concept: “Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense the absence of fear that such values will be attacked“ (Wolfers, 1962, pp. 147-156). This perception is shared by Art who believes “security is ambiguous and elastic in its meaning“ (Art, 1993, pp. 820-822). In the new international world order, born after the end of the Cold War, increased importance is attributed to the global dimension, to the loss of national sovereignty, to new international actors, new technological means, and new communication channels. States are faced with complex threats to security, which demand different responses and approaches to security provision. Traditional military-political and diplomatic instruments no longer suffice, and this situation requires new forms of cooperation between states, between states and non-governmental actors, as well as new responses in the framework of existing approaches, mechanisms and instruments of providing security. (Grizold et al. 2012, pp. 30-31) Through history, states have relied on the use of cultural diplomacy to a different extent. The USA has actively used cultural diplomacy since 1930s, when it responded to cultural offensive of Nazi Germany in Latin America (Cummings, 2003, p. 1), and even increased its use during the Cold War. Cultural diplomacy played a crucial role in the ending of the Cold War, as the freedom of expression demonstrated in cultural manifestations helped shape the mindset of people beyond the Iron Curtain. However, after the end of the Cold War the reliance on cultural diplomacy and its funding notably diminished. The goal of my analysis is twofold; Firstly, to conceptualize the relations between security policy, foreign policy and cultural diplomacy in contemporary state, and secondly, to analyse the implementation of cultural diplomacy in the context of foreign and security policy. The analysis is founded upon the case study of the USA, which still represent the leading world power and an important trendsetter for the developed world.

The subject of the present analysis is divided in the following questions:

1. Have documents of foreign and security policy of the USA from the end of the Cold War until today included cultural diplomacy?
2. Have there been any inconsistencies in the use of cultural diplomacy in the context of security and why?
3. And last – when is cultural diplomacy used in national foreign and security policy?

We presume that cultural diplomacy has largely been included in security related documents of the USA, but the practice varied in relation to individual administration. In the aftermath of the Cold War the American funding of cultural diplomacy abroad fell by over one third (Mark, 2009, pp. 2-3), which also led to inconsistencies in use, and probably prevented cultural diplomacy from developing to its fullest potential and achieving the desired effects. We believe there is a serious

lack of long-term planning in this field and cultural diplomacy is usually applied as an ad hoc solution with limited impact.

## **1. CONCEPTUALISATION OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY**

### **1.1. Cultural diplomacy as instrument of state policy**

Cummings defines cultural diplomacy as “the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understandings” (Cummings, 2003). Similar is sustained by Schneider, who argues that cultural diplomacy represents a prime example of ‘soft power’, or the ability to persuade through culture, values and ideas, as opposed to ‘hard power’, which conquers or coerces through military might (Schneider 2004, p. 147-148), while Cull (2008, p. 31) defines it as an attempt of actors to control and influence international environment via cultural means and achievements recognized abroad. Cultural diplomacy, therefore, represents an area where relations with foreign countries are formed, developed and maintained through culture, arts and education. It is an instrument of state policy that helps the state achieve its goals and objectives of foreign and security policy. Niles Maack claims it represents that aspect of diplomacy, which encompasses the efforts of a state to transmit national culture to foreign publics, and thus increase the understanding of national ideals and institutions as part of a larger attempt to build support for political and economic goals (Niles Maack, p. 2). It can be said that culture and cultural diplomacy have been important instruments of state policy and its implementation since 1938, when CD entered the USA Department of State. It was based on the following principles: avoid any trace of propaganda, stand clear of intelligence-gathering, and minimize disruption of fragile foreign cultures (Arndt, 2005, xi). In 1948 the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, known as the “Smith-Mundt“ Act, was passed to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries (Fitzpatrick, 2010, p. 5) . This Act led to the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA), radio program The Voice of America, and provided for the preparation and dissemination of information about the USA, its people and policies through press, publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad (ibid). Cultural diplomacy became an essential instrument of foreign policy of the USA and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, when it probably resembled propaganda more than diplomacy. There is, however, a substantial difference between culture and propaganda. On the one side propaganda lacks most of the cultural value, but influences the opinion of its target audience, while culture on the other exerts more

influence on elite groups and governments. A significant proof in support of the above observation is the failure of American politically oriented cultural diplomacy activities in the Middle East. The U.S. spent hundreds of millions of dollars under the direction of the Broadcasting Board of Governors to establish Al Hurrah, an American television channel in the Middle East. While this channel sometimes provides a platform for lively debates, it has not garnered a significant viewership and is regarded with suspicion as a creation of the U.S. government (Schneider, 2009, p. 4).

What exactly does cultural diplomacy then represent in the context of state policies? Cultural diplomacy is an instrument of foreign and security policy whose basic role is to transmit the information and values of the country of origin to foreign countries and vice-versa. It is, therefore, a long-term strategy of dialogue and reciprocal informing and understanding, which improves the position of all stakeholders in the process, prevents or limits the appearance and escalation of conflicts, and positively influences the formation of public opinion and the meeting of foreign-policy and security goals of the state. Cultural diplomacy should be more than just an answer to crises, and its primary mission is to develop respect for others and their way of thinking (Report of the Advisory Committee on Public Diplomacy, 2005).

### *1.1.1. Cultural diplomacy in the context of foreign policy*

Historically, cultural diplomacy represented foreign policy of a state, which applied it to facilitate the export of its culture's products. Sources from the Ancient history reported about the construction of great library in Alexandria and the policy of the Roman Republic, which invited the sons of "friendly" kings to pursue their education in Rome (Cull, 2008, p. 33). People have used culture to present themselves, to assert their power, and to understand others and be understood by them. Artists have historically functioned as important counselors or ambassadors to different rulers. Rubens was the court artist as well as official ambassador, and in the 30ies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the movies of Leni Riefenstahl and the architecture of Albert Speer were put at the service of the German Nazi Regime. The Cold War relied heavily on cultural and scientific battle between East and West in the form of the Bolshoi ballet, abstract Expressionism, and the space race (Bound et al. 2007, p. 22). Cultural diplomacy has never been apolitical; however, its political character of today is more pronounced. Some states have actually included it among the pillars of state politics, e.g. Canada (Belanger, 1999). De Vries (2008, p. 14) claims that cultural diplomacy contributes to a positive image of the country abroad, creates conditions for peaceful relations between countries, promotes sustainable development, democracy and respect of human rights and thus improves the chances for achieving foreign policy goals of a country.

In the aftermath of the Cold War cultural diplomacy of the USA suffered a substantial cut in financial funding and support. This resulted from a shortsighted

belief that cultural outreach had outlived its purpose, as the imminent military threat represented by the Soviet Union decreased. This apparent détente led to the closing of American centers, to the elimination of much of cultural programming, and ultimately to the dissolution of the United States Information Agency (USIA) itself (Schneider, 2006, p. 193-195). Many warned of long-term dangers of diminishing cultural diplomacy, but their words sounded alarmist and were largely ignored:

“Nor can it seriously be argued – as some have – that these tools of U.S. foreign policy are no longer needed now that the Cold War is over and America no longer faces major threats. There was a brief moment of euphoria following the collapse of the Soviet empire. But no specialized expertise is needed to realize that, far from being on the verge of a new order, the world has entered a period of great disorders. /.../In facing these new dangers, a re-examination of old priorities is needed. Cultural diplomacy, in the widest sense, has increased in importance, whereas traditional diplomacy and military power ... are of limited use in coping with most of these dangers.” (Laquer, 1994, p. 20).

Despite the failure of many countries to acknowledge the need for cultural diplomacy after the Cold War, we cannot, but agree, with the above statement. Radical geo-political (dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia...), economic (prevalence of capitalism and transition of majority of former communist states to market economy), and strategic (transition from bipolar to uni or multipolar organization of the world) changes in the world (Posner in Grizold et al. 2012, p. 31) should have triggered the need for strengthened cooperation and understanding among nations and cultures, and thus also for the engagement of cultural diplomacy. However, events that followed took a different turn. By the year 1998, USIA lost a third of its 1993 funding and staff. By 2003, 60% of the world USIS (US information service) posts were staffed by a single American officer. In 1994 the final phase of converting USIS libraries to closed-access electronic IRCs (Information Resource Centres) began (Arndt, 2005, pp. 540-541). Most centers were seriously downsized in terms of material and staff and relocated into Embassies into their truncated form. Many of these centers are now open only by appointment or have hours of operation that limit public use. All these led to a substantial reduction in visitors and to the alienation of foreign audiences. Despite serious problems of the USA in explaining its foreign policy to the public overseas, America responded by reducing its efforts at public diplomacy and denying/limiting access to uncensored information and to the American officials.

### *1.1.2. Cultural diplomacy in the context of security policy*

That culture represents an essential element of societal security, and that cultural diplomacy possesses a security dimension, was confirmed by the Copenhagen school of international relations, which analyzed the relationship between foreign

and security policy on one side, and culture on the other (Buzan 1991, p. 431-451). The school emphasizes social aspects of security and the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under the changing conditions and possible or actual threats (Weaver, 1993, p. 23). One of basic premises of societal security is the acknowledgement that various identity related questions can unleash conflicts stemming from political system or national sovereignty related ideas (Belanger, 1999, p. 679). Sovereignty and identity are interconnected, however, social identity can be expressed independently from state or even in contrast with political system of the state. State's sovereignty is thus not necessarily or exclusively founded on social identity, and a threat to identity does not automatically present a direct or necessary threat to sovereignty. The threat presented by cultural penetration can lead to duality in dealing with the concept of security, namely state security versus societal security (Weaver, 1993, pp. 17-40). In this, I concur with Weaver who says: "Of course, the rhetoric of security will often be employed in cases where survival, whether of security or identity, is not actually threatened, but where it is possible to legitimate political action by making reference to such a threat" (Weaver, 1993, p. 26). It is thus understandable that security represents an excellent justification for eligible and ineligible military interventions and conflicts (Gorenc, 2009). National security encompasses various subsystems aimed at providing human security and welfare, and one of them is also culture. Without the right to one's own culture, language, and values, also human security in broad or narrow sense cannot be provided, which facilitates or can even trigger a war. Wolfers (1962, pp. 147-165) emphasizes that "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. " We can thus speak about the absence of objective dangers, threats to security, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks, as well as subjective fears from experiencing all these jeopardises. Security is a state in which individuals feel safe from threats and dangers caused by others, which implies that objective factors alone are not enough to feel safe and secure, and subjective factors need to be satisfied as well.

## **2. ASSESMENT OF NORMATIVE ROLE OF CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES**

National Security Policy represents a synthesis of all state policies, while National Security Strategy (NSS) represents the basic strategic guidance document of the USA. Buzan claims than NSS implies the reduction of state vulnerabilities (Buzan in Stone, 2009, p. 7). National security documents should thus deal with security in all its manifestations and dimensions, taking into account internal and external threats to security. NSS is periodically prepared by the executive, which presents the guidelines for the development of national security system and policy

in the following mid-term, emphasizing the most important security and political challenges, and the plan for dealing with them. The strategy serves as the basis for directing the development of individual elements of national security system. The Goldwaters-Nichols Act of 1986 presented the legal basis for the formulation of the strategy. This was the fourth major post-World War II reorganization of the U.S. Defense Department. The NSS derived from the need for a greater budgetary coherence, and the strategy was supposed to present interests, goals, and path for their realization to the Congress, as well as determine the necessary financial resources (Gaddis, 2002, p. 50-51). It resulted from the belief that governments were unable of coherent and judicious use of state resources with the aim of defending and furthering the interests vital to the nation's security. National security strategy represents a strategic platform for operative security policy of the USA, and serves different purposes, among which also to communicate the Executive's strategic vision to Congress and thus support its funding requests, to communicate this vision to foreign constituencies, and to create internal consensus on foreign and defence policy within the executive branch (Snider, 1995, p. 5). Analysis of national security strategies and related documents revealed the lack of consensus on the appropriate grand strategy of national security, since the executive traditionally avoids long-term and systematic planning of the strategy, but rather engages in episodic planning, responding to particular events, when they rise to prominence (*ibid*). Different administrations perceived the issue of threats and security in various modes, and there were significant shifts in emphasis with a view to individual administrations (Worley, 2001).

When the administration of George W.H. Bush (1989-1993) settled, events in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe took a fast turn. The Bush administration was unprepared for such changes and thus reacted slowly and incoherently (*ibid* p. 15). The 1990 report emphasized the importance of public diplomacy tools that have been developed and implemented since the end of the Second World War (the USA, the Voice of America, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe), and stressed the need for an increase of cultural competences and foreign language proficiency of American military forces (*ibid*, p.13). The 1993 report focused on the building and consolidation of democracy, freedom and human rights in the Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union countries. Public diplomacy was seen as the key instrument for achieving this goal. George H.W. Bush did not include much cultural diplomacy in his NSSs, however, his national security directive 51 (NSD51) clearly defined the need for American Governmental international broadcasting capability in the drastically changed post Cold War environment. It exposed 4 missions of US government broadcasting, namely: to present and explain to foreign audiences U.S. Government policies and actions; to describe and explain American society, thought, and institutions; to provide objective and reliable news, commentary and information about U.S. and international events; to provide surrogate programming where local

governments curtail the free flow of information to their people and where surrogate programming is in the U.S. interest. It specifically emphasized that broadcasting should serve and advance U.S. foreign policy objectives and that limited resources should be directed as necessary to reflect overall U.S. foreign policy priorities, a chief priority being to further the process of democracy building. Bush also envisaged an increase of political and economic content in the services of the VOA (Voice of America) in the newly emerged and unified Europe (National Security Directive 51, 1990). From the address delivered by the President Clinton's first term national security advisor Anthony Lake "From Containment to Enlargement" (Remarks of Anthony Lake, sept 1993) can be seen that the administration considered their moment and place in the history of the world as the historic crossroads, where containment no longer represented the one and only foreign and security policy objective. It was felt that Americans no longer saw the need to be actively engaged in the new world, without the danger of Soviet Union looming over the USA. Lake also underlined Clinton's agenda for the post Cold War by declaring "The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – enlargement of the world's free community of market democracies" (ibid), which was very much in line with the priorities of his frontrunner, President Bush. In the National Security Strategy of 1994, 1995 and 1998, President Clinton stressed the importance of preventive diplomacy and integration of the USA in multilateral negotiations in crisis areas in the world, which would ultimately improve the national security of the USA. In the National Security Strategy of 1997 – A National Security Strategy for a New Century – fostering of a "peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe" is listed as the United States' first priority for advancing core national security objectives, while NATO enlargement is singled out as the principal undertaking (Haas, 1997, pp. 112-123). Also, the address of Samuel Berger, the president's national security advisor for the second term, is very illustrative: "the dialogue of foreign policy has, for too long, been frozen in the rhetoric of "the Post-Cold War Era." (Berger, 1997) The 1999 NSS touches upon the problem of complex multinational military operations, which encompass also ethnic, religious and cultural elements and thus require a solid understanding and knowledge of region, language, and the skills of multicultural communication. President Clinton and his wife took personal interest in cultural diplomacy and even hosted the first White House Conference on Culture and Diplomacy in November, 2000, with the aim to better integrate cultural concerns into foreign policy development, to recognize the importance of art and culture in the growing global economy, and to incorporate the cultural and educational strengths of the United States in diplomacy as well as U.S. business and military interests (The White House, 2000). Development of communication and technologies has placed public diplomacy also on the agenda of national security strategy, and in 2000 NSS it is presented as a key instrument for the promotion of the American leadership in global politics. A paragraph is dedicated to the issue of

public diplomacy and the importance of improving mutual understanding by reaching out to future leaders and informing the opinions of current leaders through academic, professional, and cultural exchanges. The PDD-68 (Presidential Decision Directive) of Bill Clinton defined international activities of public diplomacy as crucial in coordination of security and information activities in the context of American foreign and security policy (Clinton 2011). In his first NSS, President George W. Bush speaks of defending, preserving and extending peace, he calls for cooperation among great powers, and specifies the encouragement of free and open societies in the world. The 2002 NSS stresses the need for efficient public diplomacy, the free flow of information and the war of ideas as the main instruments in the fight against terrorism.<sup>2</sup> In congressional budget justification for 2002, President Bush also speaks about the need to invest more in International Affairs, as this is the vital part of America's leadership in the world (Congressional budget justification, 2002). The 2006 strategy emphasizes public diplomacy, the importance of foreign language proficiency, and the knowledge of foreign cultures. It also underlines the need to improve channels of communication with Muslim leaders and people and efficiently face and counter negative propaganda before it becomes rooted in the minds of people worldwide. The last and currently still valid security strategy was adopted by the Obama administration in 2010. It speaks about the importance of foreign languages, of cultural exchanges and the need to understand foreign cultures, of educational exchanges, and the forging of closer ties with foreign countries and peoples. It stresses the need to complement military force with diplomacy (general), and that diplomacy and development capacities must help to prevent conflicts. Diplomacy is described as fundamental to American national security and their defense capability, and great emphasis is placed on the prevention of conflicts. The strategy also stresses the need to support programs that cultivate interest and scholarship in foreign languages and intercultural affairs, including international exchange programs that benefit mutual understanding between foreign audiences and American society. However, the 2010 NSS only implicitly mentions cultural diplomacy, which shows that connection between security and cultural diplomacy and the importance of this relationship has not been fully recognized yet.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS

Let us open our closing remarks by exposing some of the limitations of the present research and recommendations for the future. Evaluation of success or efficiency of a strategy is an ungrateful and complicated task, and it would take

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<sup>2</sup> "We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism. This includes: (...) - using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism." The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.

several years to be able to assess the strategy in terms of efficiency and achieving the set goals and objectives, as well as accounting for other factors and actors in the political and social context of the analysed period. Another important issue are budgetary allocations, which (can and do) limit the goals and ambitions already in the process of the strategy creation, as do at the time of its implementation. This is closely connected with the question that would deserve a proper analysis of its own, namely the gap between normative and actual inclusion of cultural diplomacy in foreign and security policy of a state. This said we can move to the results of the present analysis by saying that *cultural diplomacy undoubtedly represents an important instrument of FSP and should be included already in the phase of its planning. It is a perfect example of bi/multi-lateral diplomacy, allowing states to pursue the goals and objectives beneficiary to all. Cultural diplomacy aims to develop reciprocal understanding and the sharing of values, and thus improve the interest of involved parties for peaceful and long-term solutions. By improving relations among states the level of trust increases and it is thus easier for states to achieve their own foreign and security policy goals.* Cultural diplomacy and its instruments offer a lens into the mind of what is deemed “foreign” to one’s native environment – thoughts, ideologies, intentions, cultures, and stereotypes. For governments it represents an instrument of soft power, enabling them to engage with other governments, international organizations, and non-state actors in the interest of national security (Khan, 2012). As explained already in the introduction, we based our analysis on the case study of the USA, as one of the world’s leading powers. The results obtained from the analysis thus trace the development trend for most of the developed world.

In order to see how the American post Cold War administrations responded to new security challenges, we analyzed some of the most important national security documents (national security strategy, national security review, presidential directive, presidential directive review, testimonials and addresses to foreign relations committee, etc.). To answer the second question set in the introduction, namely if there have been any inconsistencies in the use of cultural diplomacy in the context of security and why, we can state that the results revealed a variety of practices adopted by different administrations relative to CD in the context of foreign and security policy. It can be seen that all administrations invested some thought and effort in cultural diplomacy within the framework of security. The reasons are various, starting with the emphasis on multinational character of foreign policy operations, prevention of conflicts or their escalation, new and different threats to national/state/personal security, new types of warfare (terrorism), increased awareness of ideological and cultural roots, etc. All this requires a different approach to security issues and different policy tools, with emphasis on soft power, prevention and long term solutions. Our analysis also proved that normative goals have been largely achieved. Cultural diplomacy has been explicitly or implicitly included in the majority of national security related documents of all post Cold War

administrations, and has often been exposed as priority. However, most of the time, cultural diplomacy has been used ad hoc and in reaction to an event or action that has already happened or was about to happen. The main reason has not only been the absence of the grand strategy, but a lack of commitment to cultural diplomacy on the one side, and insufficient awareness of its potential in the framework of national security on the other. The present engagement of America in the world confirms this kind of behavior, namely the use of force and vast disregard of cultural diplomacy in security issues. Or better, cultural diplomacy has largely been applied in crisis areas and in the times of trouble, when tv and radio stations/programs have been funded, American libraries or corners established, exchange programs promoted. When situation have stabilized, interest and funds have also waned. Without long-term commitment cultural diplomacy cannot develop to its fullest potential, and ad hoc actions have more in common with political propaganda than with cultural diplomacy. A lot of energy, resources and people have been lost trying to invent ad hoc policies and institutions at the time of conflict, and eliminating the established policies, contacts, networks and institutions in the aftermath of the conflicts. What should be pursued is a coherent and consistent policy of making cultural diplomacy an instrument of national security policy and thus benefiting from the long term results it yields. If we use the words of former director of United States Information Agency Edward Murrow, public policy should be in on the take-offs, and not just the crash landings. On the basis of our analysis it can be said that cultural diplomacy is still mostly disregarded in the take-offs, and applied only (if) in the crash landings.

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### **KULTURNA DIPLOMATIJA- INSTRUMENT MOĆI AMERIČKE SPOLJNE I BEZBEDNOSNE POLITIKE**

*Apstrakt:* Rad je zasnovan na pretpostavci da se kulturna diplomatija uglavnom koristi i doživljava kao instrument javne diplomatije, dok odnos između kulturne diplomatije i spoljne i bezbednosne politike jedne države nije privukao mnogo naučne pažnje. Rad ima za cilj konceptualizaciju kulturne diplomatije kao instrumenta spoljne i bezbednosne politike jedne države, kao i procenu njene normativne uloge u spoljnoj i bezbednosnoj politici SAD od kraja Hladnog rata do danas. Empirijski deo rada se zasniva na analizi sadržaja američkih nacionalnih bezbednosnih dokumenata, sa naglaskom na ulozi kulturne diplomatije. Savremene države nastoje da uspešno i efikasno ostvare svoje razvojne, spoljnopolitičke i bezbednosne strategije za postizanje sinergija njihovih socijalnih, materijalnih, kadrovskih, moralnih, spoljnopolitičkih i bezbednosnih mogućnosti putem kulturne diplomatije. Složenost prisutnih pretnji u međunarodnom okruženju zahteva od država aktivnije angažovanje kulturne diplomatije kao sredstva za ostvarenje mira i bezbednosti u međunarodnoj zajednici.

*Ključne reči:* kulturna diplomatija, javna diplomatija, meka moć, nacionalna bezbednost, strategije nacionalne bezbednosti.

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