

UDC: 342.7(4)
Biblid 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. LXIII, No. 1145, pp. 54–79
Original Scientific Paper
January 2012

*Nick Stevenson*¹

European Freedom and European Memory

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to take a historical and sociological view of the current European debt crisis. In particular I take a critical view of the rise of neoliberalism across Europe and seek to return to a consideration of the displaced tradition of European liberal socialism. Here I argue that liberal socialism contains many progressive ideas that can be linked back to the European Enlightenment and offers answers to the current wave of market-led globalisation. Here I argue that the idea of critical memory remains crucial to Europe's future and its ability to be able to sustain a sense of citizenship and above all freedom for its people. Further I seek to link debates about consumerism and citizenship to the growing sense of resentment and anger that is currently spreading across Europe.

Key words: citizenship, resentment, consumerism, symbolic violence, liberal socialism.

Introduction

In the summer of 2011 a sense of crisis pervaded Europe's media. The economic crisis in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, Italy and Ireland and the responsibilities of fellow European's dominated the headlines. The banking and now broader financial crisis led to the slashing of the public sector, privatization and economic uncertainty across Europe. Demonstrations across the continent pictured ordinary citizens and grass roots social movements seeking to preserve their way of life and standard of living. This situation was made even more precarious with rising fuel, energy and food prices encouraging many citizens

¹ Nick Stevenson, Reader in Social Sciences, University of Nottingham, UK. E-mail: nick.stevenson@nottingham.ac.uk.

to take to the streets. However this crisis has been taken by many to indicate evidence of the faltering European project. Many are now proclaiming the future heralds the break-up of the European Union and the return to nationalist politics and more aggressive free market capitalism.² In addition there are also fears that the Greeks (and others) may default leading to the end of the Euro-zone. As the German tabloids have been asking why, indeed, should their citizens pay for the pension plans of Greek public sector workers?³ The idea of a social Europe that seeks to correct the excesses of globalisation while granting citizens a common citizenship, employment, job security and strong welfare states is increasingly under pressure. Across Europe, right-wing political parties have promoted neoliberalism, increasing inequality and the fear of immigrants. It is this more regressive vision of Europe that currently seems to be dominant. If the broader sense of crisis reminds many European's of its internal reconstruction at the end of the Second World War, then we need to maintain a sense of perspective. According to historian Mark Mazower,⁴ during the 1940s state planning and international aid (the Marshall plan) enabled post-war prosperity, but today's politicians are more used to a world run by the market. Europe currently seems to have little sense of an 'alternative' to the dominant policies of neoliberalism that involve privatization, job insecurity, increasing inequality, a reduced public sector, and anti-trade union laws. If we add to this a growing sense across the continent that multiculturalism has been a failure, and the ending of the Schengen agreement that allowed free mobility across borders, then clearly we are in a period of transformation. The European financial crisis is not purely about economics but involves social and cultural dimensions as well. If there are deep anxieties within political elites and some publics about Europeans being out flanked by the rising economic powers of China and India there are other perhaps more pressing dangers. David Marquand has caught the dominant mood by arguing that European societies currently risk descending into "a big pool of resentment."⁵ This resentment has a mobile focus against the poor, immigrants, Muslims, rich people, politicians and the European Union. If the post-war development of the European Union, national democracy, and treaties on human rights were meant to address the

² Martin Kettle, "The Nationalists Have Won: Europe's Dream Is Over," *The Guardian*, 24 June 2011, p. 35.

³ John Lancaster, "Once Greece Goes..." *London Review of Books*, Vol. 33, No. 14, 2011, pp. 3-7.

⁴ Mark Mazower, "Any New Marshall Plan Will Founder in the Minds of Europe's Hesitant Leaders," *The Guardian*, 6 July 2011, p. 12.

⁵ David Marquand, *The End of the West: The Once and Future of Europe*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011, p. 52.

problems of ethnic nationalism then we currently seem a long way from the dream of the inclusive European citizenship of the post-war era.

The historical emergence of European cultural identity has been the subject of a considerable amount of debate.⁶ Indeed the idea of Europe first emerges through the notion of Christendom as opposed to non-civilised barbarians. The idea of Europe as an essentially Christian civilisation is of course still with us today but makes little sense in the context of more contemporary forms of cultural and religious pluralism. However the historian Jacques Le Goff,⁷ building on the scholarship of Marc Bloch,⁸ has argued that the common experience of European feudalism made Europe imaginable as an idea in the middle-ages. This was a Europe built upon the dominance of the church and village life, the power of the nobility and a warrior class as well as ideas of chivalry, monogamy and courtly love. However twelfth century Europe could also be seen as an intolerant and hateful society given Christianity's role in persecuting heretics, Jews and Muslims in the Crusades. We can see perhaps that this idea (albeit in a reinvented form) lives on today in the rise of Right wing anti-immigrant and especially anti-Muslim political parties after 9/11. The classical sociologist Max Weber argued however that it was Protestantism that was to lay the foundations for European distinctiveness.⁹ The dominance of science and technical rationality and states governed by law and bureaucratic procedures were mostly enhanced within the European setting. Weber argued that the rationalism of Western culture had religious origins within ascetic Protestantism. The European Reformation then did not end the influence of religious ideas within Western modernity but instead helped develop a particular ethic that was necessary for the development of capitalism. This ethic rejected the enjoyment of life and hedonism more generally for devotion to work and accumulation. These features are recognised as 'cultural' by Weber and were used to dislodge the 'leisureliness' of traditional business practices.¹⁰ The spirit of capitalism (as it developed within the European context) was driven less by consuming and more by earning. The Protestant ethic could be recognised through a 'job well-done', honesty, and a lack of ostentation. These characteristics, which are of course still in evidence today, demanded that citizens attach themselves to the duty of work and rational calculation. If more postmodern times have made us critical of master-narratives like those provided by Weber, he

⁶ Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, MacMillan, London, 1995, and Heikki Mikkeli, *Europe as An Idea and An Identity*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1998.

⁷ Jacques Le Goff, *The Birth of Europe*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2005.

⁸ Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961.

⁹ Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Dover Publications, New York, 1958.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

continues to remind us of the central importance of both capitalism and religion to any wider ideas of European modernity.¹¹ We might equally remember that medieval European societies can be characterised as “the rigorous economic subjection of a host of humble folk to a few powerful men.”¹² Ideas of rank, hierarchy and control of the lower orders (that stopped short of slavery) were all a marked features of the medieval world. These features, as we shall see, are every bit as significant in shaping European modernity as Weber’s notion of the Protestant ethic.

The idea of democracy and human rights in the European setting has done a great deal historically to contain what Dennis Smith has described as “the honour code.”¹³ This is the capacity of elites to use their power to inflict their will upon others, to bring them to submission and to humiliate them. We are humiliated and generally feel deep resentment when we lack freedom, are denied agency, and feel insecure while being dismissed as a second-class citizen. If European imperialism was the source of the first wave of humiliation then the second has been provided by globalisation. As Hannah Arendt has argued ‘race’ thinking is characteristic of European imperialism and totalitarianism.¹⁴ If imperial and totalitarian rule could be justified by refusing to recognise the humanity of the ‘Other’ then the honour code can be found alive and well in imperial and totalitarian Europe. However, it suffers a set-back in post-war society given the emphasis placed upon human rights, social justice and democracy. These advances have been thrown into question more recently as neoliberal forms of globalisation have helped foster a culture of humiliation, disrespect and resentment amongst ordinary people. If democracy, human rights and social justice offer the possibility of building humane European societies then neoliberal forms of globalisation have brought this into question. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has accurately recognised the extent to which neoliberal globalisation arises less through the opposition of economics and the state than through state policy.¹⁵ Globalisation then is less the rule of corporations, as the changing dynamics of capital and state power.¹⁶ The retreat of the social state since in the 1980s, the development of part-time and temporary employment, the downgrading of trade unions, and the encouragement of more flexible labour markets have all helped shape the social and economic conditions for the humiliation of the working-class population.¹⁷ Here European

¹¹ Bryan S. Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, Routledge, London, 1994.

¹² Marc Bloch, *Feudal Society*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961, p. 443.

¹³ Dennis Smith, *Globalization: The Hidden Agenda*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 28.

¹⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1986.

¹⁵ Pierre Bourdieu *et al.*, *The Weight of the World*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999.

¹⁶ Joel Kovel, *The Enemy of Nature*, Zed Books, London, 2002, p. 70.

¹⁷ Ann Gray, *Unsocial Europe: Social Protection or Flexploitation*, Pluto Press, London, 2004.

workers are increasingly being told not only that they are in competition with locations that do not place social restrictions upon the operation of capital and that there is 'no alternative' to this state of affairs. European welfare states in this setting are increasingly being reconstructed through ideas of employability and activation. This has meant a situation where citizenship is less of a status than a contract that is built upon the responsibility to take an enterprising view of the self. The public sphere, in this setting, is no longer simply a place where views are exchanged, but also where behavioural norms are modified in ways that stress individual responsibility to secure employment.¹⁸ Missing from this contract is any discussion of the kinds of employment being made available, the persistence of poverty, unemployment and inequality, skill and wage levels and employment conditions more generally.

Globalization has acted as the justification for neoliberal policies that aim to produce an insecure and anxious citizenry in an increasingly unequal world.¹⁹ If the liberal socialism of the post-war era is currently in retreat it continues to exist as a social memory for many European citizens. In particular, Western European societies after the end of the Second World War experienced a different kind of politics that aimed to construct a society that connected the virtues of both freedom and security. Here I want to argue that it is imperative that historians and sociologists become involved in a critical politics of memory. If it is an exaggeration to argue that postmodern consumer culture seeks to institute a culture of the 'perpetual present' it undoubtedly places any alternative social movement at a considerable disadvantage.²⁰ In the context of this article, I want to actively remember the politics of this period in terms of its hopes and aspirations. This is not because I think social science should be involved in producing objectivist history, but because of the need to expand the horizons of the present. This is to recognise along with Gadamer that any excursion into history is necessarily a means of attempting to form an interpretative dialogue between past and present.²¹ Further, that the temporal tension between past and present can be a source of moral creativity as we seek to explore the possibility of different narratives and alternatives emerging in the future.²² The dialogue

¹⁸ Vando Borghi, "One-Way Europe? Institutional Guidelines, Emerging Regimes of Justification, and Paradoxical Turns in European Welfare Capitalism," *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2011, pp. 321-341.

¹⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000.

²⁰ Frederick Jameson, *The Cultural Turn*, Verso, London, 1998, p. 20.

²¹ Hans Gadamer, "The Historicity of Understanding," in Paul Connerton (ed), *Critical Sociology*, Penguin, London, 1976, pp. 117-133.

²² John Wall, *Moral Creativity: Paul Ricoeur and the Politics of Creativity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.

with the past is essentially a poetic encounter where different identities and existential possibilities may begin to emerge.

Remembering European Liberal Socialism

The historians Donald Sassoon²³ and Eric Hobsbawm²⁴ both recall what they refer to as a golden period for capitalism and the development of welfare after 1945. This was partially motivated by a fear of communism, but also recognised that ‘planning’ was required to save capitalism from its own contradictions. The era of welfare capitalism was both an attempt to rescue capitalism and to provide a bulwark against Communism, but also represented a very real victory on the part of organised labour. This was a period when the political Left and more generally the labour movement were in the ascendancy. For Norberto Bobbio the European Left wished to reduce inequalities whereas the Right has either sought to defend or preserve them.²⁵ If egalitarians tend to view inequality as socially and culturally created as well as unjust then anti-egalitarians view them as natural or as serving other values. The Left’s preference for equality has meant that it has sometimes been involved in complex trade-offs against other values such as freedom and liberty. However one of the twentieth century’s most powerful ideological forces sought to press the case for equal rights for citizens that sought to expand both equality and liberty for all. For the Left equality and liberty go together as they have historically been motivated to find an alternative to the massive social divisions created by unregulated capitalism. If the Left has not been exclusively concerned with class relationships it has historically sought to struggle for a society where capitalism did not dominate. Geoff Eley argues that since the 1850s this search has involved ideas of citizenship that preferred a society built on co-operation rather than competition and where a genuine democracy could only take root if the power of private property was regulated.²⁶ In the European setting the Left were to progressively abandon a revolutionary model of social change for one that sought to utilise state power to follow egalitarian ends. Instead of seeking to replace society with the state the Left sought to connect an egalitarian society with a deeper model of democracy. If the socialist politics

²³ Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century*, Fontana Press, London, 1997.

²⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century*, Michael Joseph, London, 1994.

²⁵ Norberto Bobbio, *Left and Right*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996.

²⁶ Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe 1850-2000*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002.

after the second world war was built upon the labour movement this began to falter after the 1970s as it became clear that the old working-class was in decline. This was not a society where class did not matter, but where the fragmentation of identities, the rise of the New Right and the decline of class solidarities plunged notions of the Left into a long crisis. If the Left was built on the ideals of public service, trade union power and the idea of progressive improvement these were all increasingly subject to scepticism during the 1980s. The Left after the assault of neoliberalism and the decline of the labour movement suffered a crisis of identity that continues today.

There are of course disputes about the extent to which liberal socialist parties in power were able to deliver a programme of increased democratisation and equality, but these were undoubtedly part of the aims of the Western European labour movement. If socialists gradually gave up on the idea of ending capitalism the democratic socialist model of development was often strongly contrasted with the United States that endured higher levels of inequality and many more of the social problems evident with unrestrained capitalism, such as higher levels of infant mortality, crime, and drug addiction. If unregulated capitalism produced a form of barbarism by producing extreme inequality, competition and commodification the Left could present itself as a force for civilisation. However missing from these recollections is the argument that liberal notions of socialism also sought to expand the freedom of the whole community. These ideas can be traced back to the European Enlightenment that sought to question the established ideas of traditional hierarchies. In particular the Enlightenment sought to emphasise the rule of law, constraints being placed upon power and individual autonomy. The extent to which liberal versions of socialism were connected to the Enlightenment could be traced through ideas of progress. Here 'reason' was to be used to question authority, criticise dogmatic beliefs and promote critical reflection. If the notion of progress seems out of date after postmodernism, the holocaust and imperialism, it did not seem that way to many of the liberal socialists of the period. As both Stephen Bronner²⁷ and Tzvetan Todorov²⁸ argue, the critical spirit of the Enlightenment is best captured by the demand for democratic and discursive forms of inquiry rather than the legitimation of totalitarianism. This tradition then is better understood through a discussion of the history of liberalism rather than the shoring up of more authoritarian regimes. It was the liberal emphasis placed upon universal rights, law, and of expanding freedom more generally that meant it could not be equated with totalitarian rule. For democratic socialists the liberal tradition was

²⁷ Stephen E. Bronner, *Reclaiming the Enlightenment*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2004.

²⁸ Tzvetan Todorov, *The Fear of Barbarians*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010.

more than the idea that it simply legitimated the rule of elites, but instead offered the possibility of bringing similar freedoms to the working class population that had been enjoyed previously by elites. For example, the Italian socialist Carlo Rosselli argues in the 1930s that the European social democracy emerging across Europe is actually a renewed form of liberalism.²⁹ This is not the Marxist struggle for a utopian society without a state, but the attempt to build a society on a rights based citizenship that emphasises individual freedom. Rosselli's vision is of a society where citizens are free to develop themselves no longer 'enslaved' by the daily humiliation of poverty and inequality. For Rosselli "socialists postulate the end of bourgeois privilege and the effective extension of the liberties of the bourgeoisie to all."³⁰ This meant that it was the labour movement who were the heir to liberalism as only they had the capacity to spread the principles of individual liberty throughout society. Later Bobbio would similarly argue for a liberal version of socialism that was built upon the rights of the individual and the democratisation of society more generally.³¹ Like Rosselli, Bobbio seeks to redefine socialism as concerned with the spread of liberty and democracy throughout society thereby offering a distinctive vision to that offered by Soviet Marxism. The Italian liberal socialism of Rosselli and Bobbio was born out of the fight against fascism while at the same time wishing to criticise ideas of direct democracy. The defining ethos of liberal socialism being the combination of the values of liberty, democracy and equality holding in check the power of elites from below through democratic processes and procedures.³²

If Rosselli and Bobbio identified the Italian problem as one of allowing ordinary people the possibility of experiencing a life of liberty then, as I have indicated, this has its historical roots in the European Enlightenment. For Bronner, the liberal legacy of the Enlightenment offered the working-class movement a dual purpose. This was the struggle for citizenship whereby they were able to reconcile the idea of liberty for all with social rights. Progressive liberalism was precisely the tradition that would be rejected by totalitarian regimes. Tzvetan Todorov identifies totalitarian thought as being evident where "the *I* of the individual must be replaced by the *we* of the group."³³ Totalitarian thought in both its Nazi and Soviet form seeks to cancel the freedom of the individual. The deliberate de-humanisation of the enemy and disavowal of pluralistic ideas are also evident here. It was the liquidation of the capacity of

²⁹ Carlo Rosselli, *Liberal Socialism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1994, p. 84.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

³¹ Norberto Bobbio, *The Future of Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

³³ Tzvetan Todorov, *Hope and Memory*, Atlantic Books, London, 2003, p. 14.

the individual for dissent by the totalitarian state that inspired many liberal socialists. If unregulated capitalism produced massive inequalities and unfairness then the state was capable of crimes against humanity and of producing a mass society.

George Orwell's liberal socialism can be seen as operating along these contours.³⁴ The nightmare vision of a state controlled society that has eliminated memory, authenticity and dissent is issued as a warning. However Orwell's liberal socialism sought to connect liberty and justice in new ways. Like many in the liberal socialist tradition a great deal of emphasis is placed upon the role of education. A free society depends on people who are not afraid to be free. Freedom is unlikely to be experienced as a value if the education system is reduced to training for employment, but by engaging with unusual ideas individuals are offered the possibility of developing a questioning and critical life. Orwell hoped that such democratically inspired individuals are unlikely to be satisfied with a society that was overly totalitarian or "organised like a beehive."³⁵ Ultimately, for Orwell, this did not mean a perfect or utopian society but rather one where economic security and liberal freedoms could be preserved while keeping more overtly authoritarian solutions to social problems at bay. Similarly Dewey³⁶ and Tawney³⁷ place a great deal of emphasis upon education as the place where freedom could be learned. Freedom here is less an idea and more a learned practice that needs to be apparent in our daily lives. The idea that education is the place where we learn to be authentic by developing our own ideas and identities can of course also be traced back to Enlightenment ideals.³⁸

The liberal socialist tradition in the context of totalitarian Europe sought to extend the idea of liberty to everyone, not simply through the formal expression of rights but to make liberty part of everyday life, and to curb the worst excesses of capitalism. The collapse of capitalism in the 1930s and the state control of 'actually existed socialism' not surprisingly made this tradition of thinking one of the major benefactors of the post-war settlement within Europe. However this 'golden period' of Western European socialism was to come to end in the 1980s. Western European liberal socialism had largely been based upon the recognition by the state of working-class institutions like trade unions and the need to build a progressive public culture.³⁹ Social democratic citizenship was a compromise

³⁴ George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Secker and Warberg, London, 1999.

³⁵ George Orwell, "The Intellectual Revolt," in Peter Davison (ed), *Orwell and Politics*, London, Penguin, 2001, p. 437.

³⁶ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1916.

³⁷ Richard H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, Collins, London, 1961.

³⁸ Maurice Bertram, *The Politics of Authenticity*, Verso, London, 1970.

³⁹ Gerassimos Moschanos, *In the Name of Social Democracy*, Verso, London, 2002.

between capital and labour that helped support a politics that gave expression to the establishment of the welfare state and the idea that all citizens were entitled to develop the self through education. The political parties of this period were more than election winning machines and were largely based upon the progressive middle class and the organised working class. Of course not all of the parties and citizens of this period could be described as liberal (more conservative strains of thought were certainly evident) however my argument is that that it was an important strain within the internal debate. For example, many of the films and much of the literature about British working-class life in the 1960s demonstrates a sense of both rising expectation and of citizens wanting to experiment with the new freedoms of class mobility and artistic expression. Freedom here was not expressed simply a means of earning more money, but crucially was understood as an opportunity to expand educational horizons and to improve the self.⁴⁰ Such a project of self-education was built through alternative organisations as well as dominant institutions and reflected a new confidence amongst many working-class people. If Orwell had wondered whether intellectual freedom would ever be valued as much as job security by working class people an affirmative answer was beginning to be felt by the end of the 1960s.⁴¹ The liberal socialist struggle for a civilised society could be broadly understood as the struggle for a dignified life for everyone. As Tawney argued, if “to lead a life worthy of human beings is confined to a minority, what is commonly called freedom would more properly be described as privilege.”⁴²

Of course we would need to recognise that liberal socialism was indeed dependent upon a world when capital was more rooted to the spot than is currently evident. Here my I do not simply to argue for the reaffirmation of the politics of a previous period or that globalisation is wholly a myth. However, there is a need to remember the politics of a previous period where it seemed reasonable to connect a politics of the state not simply to enhanced rationalisation and bureaucratisation but to a project of democratisation and enhanced liberty for ordinary citizens. This is a project that can be recast in new times.

The European Dream?

Jeremy Rifkin has recently sought to identify what he calls the European dream that rivals that of the American dream.⁴³ This dream provides an

⁴⁰ Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1958.

⁴¹ George Orwell, “The Intellectual Revolt,” in Peter Davison (ed.), *Orwell and Politics*, London, Penguin, 2001.

⁴² Richard H. Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, Penguin, London, 1964, p. 168.

⁴³ Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004.

alternative to the dysfunctional cutthroat capitalism of the United States and instead emphasises welfare provision, well-being, and quality of life. While this dream might be more distant from reality in light of the recent economic crisis, we need to remember that the European Union contains a high degree of social and cultural variety, from the relatively egalitarian and strong welfare states of the Scandinavian countries to some of the small state, low taxation countries located in Eastern Europe. Indeed Perry Anderson⁴⁴ and Pierre Bourdieu⁴⁵ argue that many intellectuals failed to grasp the reality that Europe is more responsive to business elites than it is to democratic pressures from below. If the European Union began as soldering together human rights, democracy and prosperity, it might today more accurately be said to resemble a neoliberal model. This is the Europe of a central bank and bureaucracy that offers little in the way of democratic accountability. By expanding EU membership into Eastern Europe it has allowed European capital access to the low wage economies of the East. Here we find the gradual erasure of the difference between so called free-market America as opposed to a social Europe. If Europe ultimately failed to stand up to the United States in respect of the ‘war on terror’ the same might be said in respect of the neoliberal evolution of poor wages, poverty and social exclusion. European imperatives to ‘reform’ nearly always mean a retrenchment of the welfare system and usually the opposite of the initiatives that led to the setting up of the social state after the Second World War. Here we are compelled to ask what has changed? Why did liberal European socialist ideals seem so compelling in the middle of the twentieth century but now risk being over taken by events? Here we might point to the development of a new kind of capitalism more driven by technological change, less tied to particular places and the internationalisation of the capitalist economy more generally. This has pushed individual nation-states to focus on supply side economics, seeking to make themselves attractive to large conglomerates and inward investment.

Further we might also talk of the transformation of what Max Weber called the ‘spirit’ of capitalism.⁴⁶ If European capitalism was built upon a Protestant spirit devoted to accumulation rather than enjoyment this is no longer the case within the context of consumer-oriented societies. Zygmunt Bauman argues that the dominant ethos of the system is no longer the refusal to engage in hedonistic activity.⁴⁷ A meaningful life is now a life built around the desire for commodities and consumption. These dimensions had been previously outlined by the

⁴⁴ Perry Anderson, *The New Old World*, Verso, London, 2009.

⁴⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, *Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2*, Verso, London, 2003.

⁴⁶ Max Weber, op. cit.

⁴⁷ Zygmunt Bauman, *Europe: An Unfinished Adventure*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004.

sociologist Daniel Bell who argued that the Protestant ethic originally identified by Weber had been replaced by a world of credit cards and instant gratification.⁴⁸ If the dominant character structure of the nineteenth century depended upon restraint and self-discipline then by the 1960s this was being replaced by a restless ethic of consumption. In terms of citizenship the duty to sacrifice for the good of the community has been replaced by the individual right to pleasure. The central contradiction of capitalism today is between a work place culture that demands hard work as opposed to a consumer culture that emphasises hedonism and play. If Weber found the origins of the spirit of capitalism in religion from where did the consumerist ethic emerge? In other words, and to return to Weber's problem, if we can argue that the structures of the capitalist economy have moved from a mostly national based level to a globally organised consumer economy based upon disposability and fast turn over, this posits a suggestion as to why people wish to consume. This question is not really dealt with even if we recognise the increasing value that is placed upon the design process, niche markets and branding more generally.⁴⁹ Colin Campbell argues that the answer to this puzzle lies less within the rationality of the Enlightenment than within Romanticism.⁵⁰ The mostly pleasurable associations of consumption that place emphasis on the imagination and fantasy can be located within the Romantic Movement. The desire for new sensations, novelty and fashion begins with a change in Christianity in the seventeenth century and ends with the Romantic emphasis that beauty and the imagination are the main principles of life. The Romantic emphasis upon the right to pleasure and upon emotionality become the central features of consumer capitalism.

More recently Boltanski and Chiapello argue that the new 'spirit' of capitalism is not simply focused upon consumer 'rewards' but that work itself takes on the language of creativity.⁵¹ The 'spirit' of capitalism is now provided by management gurus and the idea of the enterprising self. The Romantic ethic is no longer opposed to the capitalist system but has been systematically been incorporated into its structures. However the 'down-side' of this more flexible and innovative world (for some) is the fear of being rejected as a market failure. Intense feelings of anxiety and uncertainty in a world of short-term commitments inevitably undermine the bonds of solidarity necessary for citizenship. The idea of the global market produces a world of frantic information workers all looking over their shoulders surviving in a world

⁴⁸ Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, Heinemann, London, 1976.

⁴⁹ Scott Lash and John Urry, *Economies of Signs and Spaces*, Sage, London, 1994.

⁵⁰ Colin Campbell, *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Capitalism*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.

⁵¹ Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello, *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, Verso, London, 2005.

without the security of a decent welfare state. Here exclusion takes on a new meaning in that being excluded from the labour market is not simply to be looked down on as a second class citizen, but it is also to be excluded from the world of consumption through which many modern citizens imaginatively live their lives. If the everyday world of consumer capitalism can be said to have 'democratised luxury' then any attempt to curtail the rights and freedoms to enjoy this world of consumer pleasure begins to sound like a return to more puritanical attitudes.⁵² This is perhaps important in the current context, for if social liberalism is to be revived then a renewed emphasis would need to be placed upon social responsibility as well as freedom. The call for freedom has become the freedom to consume and enjoy lifestyles of hyper-consumption that can be easily connected to the rise of neo-liberalism and the reluctance to pay high levels of taxation. The moral commitment to a shared community and the common good as well as freedoms beyond those of consumption need to be at the fore of creating a new European liberal socialism. While some of the literature on responsibility has simply dismissed concerns with freedom as exemplifying capitalist individualism, it seems that a new contract between freedom and responsibility is required at this juncture.⁵³ The balance between the freedom to follow a life of your own choosing while maintaining a sense of responsibility for children, nature, and vulnerable others is a good place to start. The ethical life then needs to recognise both the mutual importance of freedom and responsibility in the European setting. Nevertheless we need to be careful and should not simply follow a number of communitarian writers in insisting upon the rules of community as opposed to liberty of the self.⁵⁴ Here there is a tendency to suggest that 'bad behaviour' is the result of the breakdown of the social order and morality more generally. Along with globalisation and neoliberalism there comes a renewed emphasis on the moral policing role of the state and anti-liberalism more generally. However as I have argued communitarianism in seeking a renewed emphasis upon morality (which has a tendency to become repressive and illiberal) neglects some of the broader economic and social transformations necessary to understand European modernity.

Globalisation, on this reading, has been good for capitalism but disastrous for the creation of the common bonds of citizenship. Deindustrialisation, regime shopping, out-sourcing, anti-trade union laws, and labour market flexibility are among the features that have promoted a new culture of capitalism. If the old

⁵² Rosalind H. Williams, *Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Nineteenth Century France*, University of California Press, California, 1982.

⁵³ Barry Smart, *Facing Modernity*, Sage, London, 1999, p. 180.

⁵⁴ Amitai Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule*, Profile Books, London, 1997.

welfare capitalism needed to keep workers ready and able to work then flexible capitalism can either import workers from abroad or find new investment opportunities. Further the development of Right-wing political parties since the 1980s have appealed to moderately affluent voters by offering to slim down taxes, cut welfare bills and, of course, to restrict the flows of immigrants. All of these aspects have effectively played upon the fears of voters and ended up demonising the poor. The possibilities for the cultural development of working-class people have been severely restricted during this period. If the 1960s was a period of rising levels of optimism and inclusive citizenship this has largely been replaced by uncertainty, consumerism and the use of vicious stereotypes. Entrenched poverty has been dealt with through much tougher penal policies and welfare-to-work schemes that are aimed at forcing the unemployed into increasingly poorly paid forms of employment.⁵⁵

The new capitalism also has implications for the culture of politics more generally. Richard Sennett has argued that the more uncertain world of global competitiveness, consumerism and supply side economics undermines the careful 'craft' of citizenship.⁵⁶ Firstly political platforms appear to be increasingly similar being pro-business and anti-immigrant which in itself leads those in charge of 'spinning' political messages to overstate the differences between the parties. Also, there is an increasing amount of emphasis placed upon 'character' and questions of 'competence' which again serves to mask the basic similarities between the political parties. Politics has become more consumerist with the demand for 'instant' changes where a sense of disconnection amongst the electorate means that increasingly smaller numbers of people follow and participate within the broader democratic culture. While these changes from the past can be over-stated and are more in evidence in some countries rather than others, they are clearly not without relevance. In more general terms Colin Crouch describes this condition as post-democratic.⁵⁷ Here the formal rituals and procedures of citizenship are in place but are increasingly controlled by powerful business elites. As the egalitarian emphasis of liberal socialism has gone into decline so capitalism has increasingly gained control over the political process. It is under the conditions of post-democracy that the common bonds of citizenship are downgraded, trade unions are marginalised, and the poor are treated with contempt. Citizenship becomes generally weakened as elites have enhanced their control of the political process and the

⁵⁵ Loïc Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004.

⁵⁶ Richard Sennett, *The Culture of the New Capitalism*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, and London, 2006.

⁵⁷ Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004.

meaning of life is redefined by harsher labour conditions, consumerism, and a slimmed down welfare state. If in the past European democracy was contrasted with European totalitarianism today this comparison has fallen into disuse. If under liberal socialism the aim was the construction of a relatively egalitarian society and individual freedom then today we are more likely to hear of the moral failings of the poor and the need to create a new entrepreneurial spirit amongst the population more generally. Instead, the most common contrast drawn is between those states that have managed to successfully 'modernise' their welfare regimes and those that remain bureaucratic and uncompetitive.

Finally, as we have seen, liberal socialism placed a great deal of emphasis upon the need to educate the self. This was not only a matter of gaining educational qualifications, but of discovering the authentic path of the self. The idea that all citizens have their own unique potential and that the point of life is to discover our own direction dominated the educational philosophies of this period.⁵⁸ This emphasis has now been displaced by league tables, teaching to test and other features all used to focus attention on results. The market here has not however reversed the considerable educational inequalities and advantages of middle class children to succeed. If, in the past, the concern was with educational freedom then in the current setting freedom in relation to schooling is more concerned with the promotion of private institutions and the break-up of the state. Here my argument is that while accepting the considerable pleasures of consumption they are mostly (although not all) fleeting and are no match for discovering more 'authentic' passions of the self. The problem here is that as consumer culture has grown it has converted education into the means to market success thereby displacing some of the troubling questions that educators sought to pose. As Erich Fromm knew all too well, more authentic ideas of freedom actually sit uncomfortably with ideas of market freedom.⁵⁹ The freedom of the self is more concerned with 'being' than it is with 'having'. Such a view can be traced back to the Enlightenment and beyond and suggests that we are only truly awake when we are realising our own unique selves in a supportive community.

Therefore, in this context, can we still speak of a European dream that is distinctive from the rise of a consumer society and the promotion of free-market individualism? Manuel Castells has argued convincingly that the European project is now perhaps best understood in the context of globalisation.⁶⁰ The fact that most European trade remains within the European Union means that more socially progressive reactions to neoliberalism remain a possibility. An alternative

⁵⁸ Nick Stevenson, *Education and Cultural Citizenship*, Sage, London, 2011.

⁵⁹ Erich Fromm, "The Humanistic Credo," in Rainer Funk (ed), *The Erich Fromm Reader*, The Humanities Press, New Jersey, NJ, 1994, pp. 127-132.

⁶⁰ Manuel Castells, *The End of the Millennium*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1998.

European identity would need to be found beyond mostly technocratic elites and the considerable appeal of reactive racism and nationalism. What Castells refers to as a 'project identity' would of course need to complement rather than replace national, local and regional identity.⁶¹ However, the massacre of Norwegians by a right-wing extremist in the summer of 2011 highlighted the continuing threat from an explicitly European far right. Brevik's mission was widely reported to 'save' Europe from Muslims and cultural Marxist supporters of multiculturalism. Here, the concern is perhaps less that there may be others like him, but more that the rhetoric he used on his web-pages of indignation, intolerance, and hatred closely mirrors that of the more mainstream European Right.⁶² Whether Europeans still have the capacity to imagine a more inclusive social and cultural identity (a genuine 'project identity') remains to be seen. The new world of informational capitalism (of globalisation's both real and imagined) has yet to pursue a political project of the substance similar to that which has allowed capitalism to transform itself in the age of technology and consume identities. As Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck argue, if the European Union remains one of the most significant and successful pieces of institution building since the end of the Second World War then it needs to be reimagined in the context of the present.⁶³ It can only do so, however (a point not made by Beck and Giddens) if it recognises the threat of a new fundamentalism.

Market Totalitarianism?

If the transition of citizenship has come from above in respect of business and political elites rather than pressure from below what does this tell us about the ways in which European citizenship is being remade? Michael Mann has convincingly argued that the social citizenship of the post-war period reflected the balance of power between ruling elites and the organised working class.⁶⁴ If this balance of power has now shifted (as it seems to have done) how might we understand the emergent form of citizenship in the European context? What remains important about Mann's reflections is the importance he places upon the power of elites, but also how their rule needs to be negotiated through compromise, consent and other features. For the historian Tony Judt, the European social democracy of the post war period was built upon the idea that

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

⁶² Simon Reid-Henry, "Still, Small Voice of Calm," *New Statesman*, 1 August 2011, pp. 23–25.

⁶³ Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, "Open Letter on the Future of Europe," in Charles Lemert *et al.* (eds), *Globalization: A Reader*, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 336–338.

⁶⁴ Micheal Mann, "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship," *Sociology*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1987, pp. 339–354.

the state and citizens had a responsibility for each other and that this could be demonstrated through access to common services, public provision and inclusive notions of community.⁶⁵ The welfare state required relatively high rates of taxation, but became legitimate to the extent to which it delivered a more equal society and bound members of society together in a common community. However, since the 1980s, the idea of there being a common good has come under pressure as notions of the public became devalued. The rise of gated communities, the privatisation of space and consumerism, and the downgrading of welfare have all pushed society into a more market driven direction. For Judt, the Left need to reject radicalism for a progressive conservatism that becomes focused on questions of security, prudence and stability. While this argument can be pushed too far, it is true that questions of freedom and security need to be held in balance. Notable in Judt's account is the emphasis placed on the discursive aspect of politics and how this has become reconfigured.⁶⁶ One of the major achievements of social democracy through the welfare state was the bonding of both the middle and working class to democratic institutions. In other words, Judt's account recognises the extent to which ideological constructions need to relate to class positions more generally. For Judt, this retreat from common forms of citizenship is especially evident in the idea that a sense of progress and upward mobility, experienced by many in the 1960s, was dependent upon the state. As Zygmunt Bauman comments, the welfare state is partly a victim of its own success in producing generations of well looked after citizens who no longer think they need a safety net.⁶⁷ The poor become the 'Other' in the consumer society precisely because they are a constant reminder of what can happen in our insecure world.

Elsewhere Tony Judt goes as far as to argue that the that the dominance of market driven solutions currently grip the common sense of elites and intellectuals in a similar fashion to the way that Marxism dominated the minds of many intellectuals in the 1930s.⁶⁸ Here Judt refers to the classic work of Polish intellectual Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*.⁶⁹ Milosz's text describes how a generation of intellectuals across Europe became gripped by a 'new faith'.⁷⁰ These intellectuals were largely motivated by a doctrine that aimed to produce a perfected mankind arriving at some point in the distant future. Doctrinaire

⁶⁵ Tony Judt, *Ill Fares the Land*, Allen lane, London, 2010.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁶⁷ Zygmunt Bauman, *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor*, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1998.

⁶⁸ Tony Judt, *The Memory Chalet*, William Heinemann, London, 2010.

⁶⁹ Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, Penguin, London, 1981.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

Marxism offered a kind of anti-Enlightenment culture as it was driven by a desire to regulate and control thought. Herein the liberal traditions of the West were dismissed as doctrinaire, evil, elitist and hostile to the needs of ordinary people. The book stands as a criticism of Left authoritarianism and has a great deal in common with the earlier warnings that Orwell had made in respect of a form of Marxism that knew more about doctrine than it did of the truth. For Judt the contemporary market like authoritarian Marxism has a circle of true believers, is dogmatic, and produces a certain blindness to its short-comings.⁷¹ As Judt argues “the thrall in which an ideology holds a people is best measured by their collective inability to imagine alternatives.”⁷² The critical component of Judt’s historical thinking is quite simply to reveal that in recent times that Europeans have seen a world quite different to that of the present where politics was mainly concerned with developing security and freedom for all after the market failures and authoritarian politics of the 1930s. The introduction of market rationality not only corrodes a shared sense of fraternity and community but also feeds a more general sense of resentment. A common form of citizenship only becomes possible if we learn to rethink the state as the only mechanism available to reduce the power of markets and act in the common good.

Missing from Judt’s account is the role played by political elites in justifying the status quo and the war against social citizenship. In general, Judt’s account places too much on the liberation struggles of the 1960s which are read in an overly conservative manner. For Judt it was the rampant individualism of the 1960s that has led to the rampant individualism characteristic of market driven societies. While there is perhaps a flicker of truth in this account, it should have been more carefully located in some of the problems experience by social democratic governments in the 1980s. Further ‘progressive’ social movements including feminism, black politics, ecology and gay rights all emerged out of the 1960s. Judt is nonetheless right to argue that market rationality is becoming the new political common sense amongst European elites. Here we perhaps need to consider the role of elites and questions of symbolic power. Returning to the sociological analysis of Pierre Bourdieu, if globalisation is often used as a cover for a top down strategy of neoliberal domination then we need to understand how this particular view of reality has become imposed on the citizenry. Here Judt is partially correct in seeking to remember when ideas of freedom were understood somewhat differently during social democratic periods of dominance, but we need to understand more precisely how this definition of common sense has come to dominate the political field. With this in mind, Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant argue that neoliberalism acts as a form of

⁷¹ Tony Judt, *The Memory Chalet*, op. cit., p.179.

⁷² Ibid.

cultural imperialism. By which they mean that it “has the power to universalise particularisms linked to a singular historical tradition by causing them to be misrecognised as such.”⁷³ Neoliberalism as a form of cultural logic grew up in the context of the United States and is fast becoming a global logic that aims to judge, assesses, and ultimately displaces other modes of development like social democracy. This should be recognised as an export from a particular world region (namely the United States) that addresses not only the interests of global elites, but has built into it a set of historical understandings that take the experience of the United States as the norm. The effect of this migration of ideas not only de-historises other traditions like European social democracy, but creates a false universalisation through ideas of Westernisation. The West becomes the site of multiple forms of development that historically have attached themselves to different territories, and in different ways.

If neoliberalism acts as a particular form of symbolic domination then it should be understood as a form of class power. Michael Mann argues that wherever neoliberal policies are implemented they end up favouring the wealthy.⁷⁴ This does not mean however they are simply the expression of the global business class although these interests tend to be the ‘back-seat driver’⁷⁵ and can nudge or cajole the driver of the vehicle (the political class) in a particular direction, but they are not in full control of the direction of travel. However, as I have argued throughout, if the global economy can push policy in this direction, it is ultimately the state that makes or breaks neoliberalism. It has been the considerable symbolic power of political elites that have normalised these policies. Here we need to develop what might be called “a political economy of symbolic violence.”⁷⁶ We need a cultural sociology that seeks to explain how systems of media and education solidify the rule of elites through the construction of knowledge and information. Here we could also point to the role that education plays in constructing elites through education while trying to pass off their success through ideas of a meritocracy. Further ruling elites are granted other symbolic resources through the increasing domination of European media by a limited number of conglomerates. Much of the scholarly talk of ‘globalisation’ has served to mystify the extent to which particular media patterns are largely the result of state policy.⁷⁷ The decline of public service broadcasting and the arrival of more commercial television systems across Western Europe has

⁷³ Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, “The Cunning of Imperialist Reason,” in Loïc Wacquant (ed), *Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 178.

⁷⁴ Micheal Mann, *Incoherent Empire*, Verso, London, 2003, p. 178.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁷⁶ Loïc Wacquant, “Symbolic Power in the Rule of the State Nobility,” in Loïc Wacquant (ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 134.

⁷⁷ Kai Hafez, *The Myth of Media Globalization*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007.

gathered apace since the 1980s.⁷⁸ The growth in the dominance of television as a provider of news and entertainment (despite the arrival of the Internet) has concentrated power in the hands of private corporations that seek to control the media for reasons of profit and influence.⁷⁹ This then hands considerable power to elites to press particular views of ‘reality’ that go increasingly unchallenged in a world where the labour movement has lost power. While the circuits of elite power are inevitably more complex and contradictory than this argument suggests, they remain historically unprecedented.

Neoliberalism then is not only a set of practices but is equally a form of symbolic domination. Critical intellectuals and social movements have a special responsibility to interrupt the educative project of neoliberalism by talking of its hidden costs, but also to provide alternative interpretations and means of understanding. For Bourdieu, what is required in the first instance is a cultural politics that recognises the “the social costs of economic decisions” in terms of the development of inequality, uncertainty and humiliation along with widespread indignation, fear of losing status and, of course, outright resentment.⁸⁰ The other call is to try and defend the social aspect of the state by improving health care, reducing working hours, and improving social protection more generally. The problem is however that all of these features are likely to take a profound battering due to the down-sizing of the social state and the politics of privatisation that has broken out across Europe due to the impact of the broader financial crisis with which this paper began.

The Search for Utopia?

In this setting we need to ask what a feasible alternative might look like? In terms of the critical politics of memory I am advocating here that the question might be reconstituted through the question what do European’s need to remember to avoid the problems of the past? If part of the ‘hidden’ costs of globalisation is a downward spiral of social protection, increased competition and uncertainty then what can be done to address these issues? Here European’s should be urged to remember some of the historical consequences of living in a society where many saw themselves as victims. Omer Bartov argues that it was a widespread sense of humiliation, defeat and victimhood that historically brought so much destruction in its wake. The sense of being a victim tends to blunt citizens’ sense of their own destructiveness.⁸¹ Victimhood encourages citizens to focus upon their own pain and

⁷⁸ Kevin Williams, *European Media Studies*, Sage, London, 2005.

⁷⁹ Ben H. Bagdikian, *The Media Monopoly*, Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 2005.

⁸⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000.

⁸¹ Omer Bartov, *Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide and Modern Identity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.

troubled circumstances. This is a social setting that does not encourage citizens to take responsibility for the Other or the wider community. The totalitarian regimes of Europe's past sought to rid of unwanted Others often by blaming 'minorities' for past humiliations and defeats. This was a Europe of suffering that, according to historian Timothy Snyder, saw totalitarian regimes murder 14 million people between 1933 and 1945.⁸² Indeed most of these victims did not die in the camps, but were more often the result of state driven policies of deliberate starvation. Europeans need reminding that the feeling of humiliation and defeat can lead to the need for revenge and hatred. The Europe after the end of the Second World War followed a path of human rights, democracy, and social responsibility designed to contain (or at least constrain) these destructive feelings by building a world where everyone's freedom and security mattered. If a socially liberal society could be built based upon rising levels of prosperity, economic security and rights to self-development, while always likely to be imperfect, then this would hold in check some of the destructive politics of the past that were forged on the anvil of war and economic misery. This is the European story that needs to be remembered in the context of the present.

Such a memory would require a more cosmopolitan set of co-ordinates than usually exists when it comes to viewing the past. From this we may take a sense of history as aiding public self-reflection to apply critically to a changing sense of the present. Indeed, such features have been argued to be one of the central characteristics of European modernity.⁸³ Here there have been three main intellectual avenues pursued to save Europe from the indignation that dominated the past and threatens to be revived in the future. The first is Habermas's view of a social Europe where European integration is deepened in order to prevent European nations from descending into vicious forms of nationalism.⁸⁴ The state here is caught in a dilemma that if it raises taxes to underwrite programmes of welfare and inclusion that increasingly footloose capital can more easily move elsewhere. The problem with such a solution of course is that it seems increasingly unrealistic in the context of the present. Anthony Giddens's idea of a progressive third way agenda for Europe's centre left parties, which places as much emphasis upon responsibilities as rights, has lost ground in the global recession and for its failure to develop a sufficiently critical language of the market.⁸⁵ In practice, the third way often tends to

⁸² Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, Bodley Head, London, 2010.

⁸³ Gerard Delanty, "The European Heritage: History, Memory and Time," in Chris Rumford (ed), *The SAGE Handbook of European Studies*, SAGE, London, 2009, pp. 36–51.

⁸⁴ Jürgen Habermas, "Crossing Globalization's Valley of Tears," *New Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1999, pp. 51–57.

⁸⁵ Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998.

emphasise the responsibilities of the poor rather than the wealthy and more elite interests. However, in the context of the present, the aim to rethink the liberal socialist tradition while recognising the importance of ideas of responsibility cannot be under-estimated. Finally there is the idea that Europe requires a European-wide grass roots movement from below seeking to construct a people's Europe.⁸⁶ However European citizens, despite considerable resistance, have yet to display the appetite for the social struggles that might turn these aspirations into a reality.

Here we need to remember that the prospects for a social and liberal Europe were bolstered by the collective experience of catastrophe. The need to construct a Europe based upon freedom and social solidarity undoubtedly had its roots in the politics of the 1930s. The reshaping of the continent was both a European as well as a national form of politics. While Anthony D. Smith has argued it is only nations that have memories, here it is important to point to more cosmopolitan constructions of the past.⁸⁷ Such views are at best misleading if we follow Ulrich Beck's ideas about the possibility of a second modernity.⁸⁸ If the first stage of modernity was one of self-contained nation-states then globalisation moves into a contemporary era with a more enhanced sense of interconnection. While this does not necessarily bring with it a more developed sense of being European or indeed of European responsibilities as the recent debt crisis bears out, cosmopolitanisation at least introduces the possibility of memories that flow across previous established borders of nationhood. If the routes towards a social Europe are less than certain we are at least granted the imaginative possibility of talking about differences and similarities across cultural borders. If Europe is now the site of an insecure and increasingly anxious citizenry who fear downward mobility without the protection of the social state then perhaps now is the time to have a closer look at our shared history. Given the continued power of the nation-state, the argument here is that there cannot simply be a post-national Social Europe. National identities, despite the problems of the past, as the histories of liberal socialism demonstrated, remain for many one of the few remaining sources of solidarity. Here we need to give up opposing cosmopolitanism and nationalism and look for ways in which they might work together.⁸⁹ As we have seen, cosmopolitanism in the case of the European Union is not necessarily more

⁸⁶ Andy Mathers, *Struggling for a Social Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007.

⁸⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995.

⁸⁸ Ulrich Beck, "The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity," *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2000, pp. 79–105.

⁸⁹ Craig Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream*, Routledge, London, 2007.

progressive than nationalism. The recovery of the idea of bringing liberalism home for the majority of citizens is not one that can be exercised exclusively at the national or post-national level. There is nothing exclusively European about liberal socialism, yet we do need to think quite carefully about how the historical gains of a previous (and now fading) period can be held onto and revived in the increasing indignant culture of the present. These problems are enough to cancel any idea of the end of history or the equally misleading idea that human societies (like human-beings) can escape their own pasts. Instead the remembered past is part not only of our collective experience, but also part of the cultural resources that we will need to face the challenges of the future. The attempt to dispense with the past (or even put it on hold) only risks storing up problems for us in the near future. Globalisation in this sense is one part fiction (justifying neoliberal reform) and one part reality pointing to new challenges to Europeans, hoping to keep the memories of their progressive solutions alive. As Norman Birnbaum argues, most children who have benefited from the social reforms of the past (both European and American) lack any sense of what this has given them.⁹⁰ The development of the media of mass communication as the dominant educators of the consumer age can hardly be relied upon to communicate this sense. If European socialist parties continue to argue for the protection of the public reforms that increased the quality of our common lives, they have perhaps not paid enough attention to their own history. The question remains: “how are the hopes of citizenship to find a sense of moral purpose outside of the lessons of history?” Could the citizens of today find new meanings in the present through an engagement with the politics of the past? Unless we are prepared to sacrifice collective ideas of freedom and security to the uncertainties of the market, then the past contains lessons to learn. This does not of course mean that all of our answers can be found by simply returning to the philosophical and political traditions of the past. As I have indicated, questions of globalisation and the ecological crisis should be enough to persuade us that there are genuinely new challenges for European modernity. However a return to the past could yet encourage us to remember not only European tragedy and suffering, but a sense of hope as well.

Bibliography

1. Anderson, Perry, *The New Old World*, Verso, London, 2009.
2. Arendt, Hannah, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1986.
3. Bagdikian, Ben H., *The Media Monopoly*, Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 2005.

⁹⁰ Norman Birnbaum, *After Progress: American Social Reform and European Socialism in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 380.

4. Bartov, Omer, *Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide and Modern Identity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.
5. Bauman, Zygmunt, *Europe: An Unfinished Adventure*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004.
6. Bauman, Zygmunt, *Work, Consumerism and the New Poor*, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1998.
7. Beck, Ulrich, "The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity," *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2000, pp. 79–105.
8. Bell, Daniel, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, Heinemann, London, 1976.
9. Berman, Maurice, *The Politics of Authenticity*, Verso, London, 1970.
10. Birnbaum, Norman, *After Progress: American Social Reform and European Socialism in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.
11. Bloch, Marc, *Feudal Society*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961.
12. Bobbio, Norberto, *Left and Right*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996.
13. Bobbio, Norberto, *The Future of Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987.
14. Boltanski, Luc and Ève Chiapello, *The New Spirit of Capitalism*, Verso, London, 2005.
15. Borghi, Vando, "One-Way Europe? Institutional Guidelines, Emerging Regimes of Justification, and Paradoxical Turns in European Welfare Capitalism," *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2011, pp. 321-341.
16. Bourdieu, Pierre, *Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2*, Verso, London, 2003.
17. Castells, Manuel, *Acts of Resistance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000.
18. Bourdieu, Pierre and Loïc Wacquant, "The Cunning of Imperialist Reason," in Loïc Wacquant (ed), *Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 178–198.
19. Bourdieu, Pierre et al., *The Weight of the World*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999.
20. Bronner, Stephen E., *Reclaiming the Enlightenment*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2004.
21. Calhoun, Craig, *Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream*, Routledge, London, 2007.
22. Campbell, Colin, *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Capitalism*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.
23. Castells, Manuel, *The End of the Millennium*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1998.
24. Crouch, Colin, *Post-Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004.
25. Delanty, Gerard, "The European Heritage: History, Memory and Time," in Chris Rumford (ed), *The SAGE Handbook of European Studies*, SAGE, London, 2009, pp. 36-51.
26. Delanty, Gerard, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, MacMillan, London, 1995.
27. Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education*, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1916.
28. Eley, Geoff, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe 1850-2000*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002.
29. Etzioni, Amitai, *The New Golden Rule*, Profile Books, London, 1997.
30. Fromm, Erich, "The Humanistic Credo," in Rainer Funk (ed), *The Erich Fromm Reader*, The Humanities Press, New Jersey, NJ, 1994, pp. 127-132.

31. Gadamer, Hans, "The Historicity of Understanding," in Paul Connerton (ed), *Critical Sociology*, Penguin, London, 1976, pp. 117-133.
32. Giddens, Anthony, *The Third Way*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1998.
33. Giddens, Anthony and Ulrich Beck, "Open Letter on the Future of Europe," in Charles Lemert *et al.* (eds), *Globalization: A Reader*, Routledge, London, 2010, pp. 336-338.
34. Gray, Ann, *Unsocial Europe: Social Protection or Flexploitation*, Pluto Press, London, 2004.
35. Habermas, Jürgen, "Crossing Globalization's Valley of Tears," *New Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1999, pp. 51-57.
36. Hafez, Kai, *The Myth of Media Globalization*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007.
37. Hobsbawm, Eric, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century*, Michael Joseph, London, 1994.
38. Hoggart, Richard, *The Uses of Literacy*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1958.
39. Jameson, Frederick, *The Cultural Turn*, Verso, London, 1998.
40. Judt, Tony, *Ill Fares the Land*, Allen lane, London, 2010.
41. Judt, Tony Robert, *The Memory Chalet*, William Heinemann, London, 2010.
42. Kovel, Joel, *The Enemy of Nature*, Zed Books, London, 2002.
43. Lancaster, John, "Once Greece Goes....," *London Review of Books*, Vol. 33, No. 14, 2011, pp. 3-7.
44. Lash, Scott and John Urry, *Economies of Signs and Spaces*, Sage, London, 1994.
45. Le Goff, Jacques, *The Birth of Europe*, Blackwell, Oxford, 2005.
46. Mann, Michael, *Incoherent Empire*, Verso, London, 2003.
47. Mann, Michael, "Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship," *Sociology*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1987, pp. 339-354.
48. Marquand, David, *The End of the West: The Once and Future of Europe*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011.
49. Mathers, Andy, *Struggling for a Social Europe*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007.
50. Mikkeli, Heikki, *Europe as An Idea and An Identity*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1998.
51. Milosz, Czeslaw, *The Captive Mind*, Penguin, London, 1981.
52. Moschanos, Gerassimos, *In the Name of Social Democracy*, Verso, London, 2002.
53. Orwell, George, "The Intellectual Revolt," in Peter Davison (ed), *Orwell and Politics*, London, Penguin, 2001.
54. Orwell, George, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Secker and Warberg, London, 1999.
55. Rifkin, Jeremy, *The European Dream*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004.
56. Rosselli, Carlo, *Liberal Socialism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1994.
57. Sassoon, Donald, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century*, Fontana Press, London, 1997.
58. Sennett, Richard, *The Culture of the New Capitalism*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, and London, 2006.
59. Smart, Barry, *Facing Modernity*, Sage, London, 1999.

60. Smith, Anthony D., *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995.
61. Smith, Dennis, *Globalization: The Hidden Agenda*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006.
62. Snyder, Timothy, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, Bodley Head, London, 2010.
63. Stevenson, Nick, *Education and Cultural Citizenship*, Sage, London, 2011.
64. Tawney, Richard H., *The Radical Tradition*, Penguin, London, 1964.
65. Tawney, R. H., *The Acquisitive Society*, Collins, London, 1961.
66. Todorov, Tzvetan, *The Fear of Barbarians*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010.
67. Todorov, Tzvetan, *Hope and Memory*, Atlantic Books, London, 2003.
68. Turner, Bryan S., *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, Routledge, London, 1994.
69. Wall, John, *Moral Creativity: Paul Ricoeur and the Politics of Creativity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.
70. Wacquant, Loïc, "Symbolic Power in the Rule of the State Nobility," in Loïc Wacquant (ed), *Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 133-150.
71. Wacquant, Loïc, *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2004.
72. Weber, Max, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Dover Publications, New York, 1958.
73. Williams, Kevin, *European Media Studies*, Sage, London, 2005.
74. Williams, Rosalind H., *Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Nineteenth Century France*, University of California Press, California, 1982.