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National Security Strategies of Russia (2009) and the United States (2010): A New Stage in the Reproduction of Incompatible National Identities²

ABSTRACT

The author carries out comparative analysis of the national security strategies of Russia (2009) and the United States (2010), to show how they serve in the reproduction of the two states' incompatible national identities. This incompatibility is the main cause of Russia and the United States' inability for real rapprochement, including the most recent attempt during the period of the adoption of these documents. The theoretical framework of the analysis is David Campbell's performative theory, which considers foreign policy (including the adoption of foreign policy documents) as the central practice in constitution and reproduction of national identity. The analysis of the United States and Russia's identities and their foreign policies shows that they are incompatible in many respects, which makes the two powers see each other as a threat in a globalized world. The conclusion of the most recent national security strategies' comparative analysis in relation to values, threats and means is that they are only a new stage in the process of this incompatibility reproduction. The real rapprochement between Russia and the United States will become possible only

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when they find a way to establish a common identity, based on a common view of some external threat.

Key words: National Security Strategy, comparative analysis, national identity, performative theory, the United States, Russia.

Introduction

In March Geneva, Hillary Clinton — for the first time as Secretary of State — met her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. The meeting was aimed at marking the beginning of a new trend towards the improvement of the two countries' relations, after they hit an all-time low in the post-Cold War period due to the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. The intention of the new U.S. (Barack Obama's) administration to offer Russians a new beginning in mutual relations was expressed by the computer phrase "reset" first used by Vice-President Joe Biden. Clinton used the Geneva meeting as an opportunity for a symbolic move — to give Lavrov an unusual present, a red button on a yellow box, which had the word "reset" written in both the English and Russian. The problem was a misspelled Russian word — instead of "*perezagruzka*" (a Russian translation of "reset"), it read "*peregruzka*", which means "overload". Immediately after he unwrapped the gift, with a smile on his face, Lavrov drew his colleague's attention to the mistake.³ The aftermath showed that this unintentional mistake, in a symbolic way, anticipated the fate of this most recent attempt of rapprochement between the two powers. It was short-lived and ended in failure, being followed by a new stage of strained mutual relations that Russia and the United States are currently going through.

It is beyond question that the 2009-2011 period brought some important achievements regarding the improvement in relations of the two states. To mention a few of them would suffice: forging cooperation regarding the conflict in Afghanistan; a common position towards the Iranian nuclear programme; opening the European security dialogue under the auspices of the OSCE; Russia's WTO accession; and, maybe the most important, the signing and ratification of the New START, the latest in a series of bilateral treaties on strategic nuclear arms reduction. Moreover, this period brought a cooperative spirit to a level which had been absent in U.S.-Russian relations since the short period that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, this "honeymoon" lasted only for about two years. During 2011, some of the achievements mentioned above were called into question, while several new sources of discord appeared. It can be claimed that the immediate causes of the reversal in the positive trend in the two countries' relations were the "Arab spring" and the negative Russian reaction to the

³ "Clinton and Lavrov hit the 'peregruzka' button", *RT*, Internet, <http://rt.com/usa/news/clinton-and-lavrov-hit-the-peregruzka-button/> 18/9/2012.

continuation of the American practice of intervention in the internal affairs of other states for a regime change, as well as U.S. resolve to unilaterally build an anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, as this is only one more in a series of several failed attempts of Russian-American rapprochement in recent history, we should move beyond the immediate causes and look for deeper sources of the renewal in Russian-American rivalry.

The answer to the question about the sources is offered by David Campbell's performative theory. In this paper the argument is offered that the repeated failures of Russian-American rapprochement are the consequence of their essentially incompatible national identities, which are performatively constituted and reproduced through their foreign policy practices. In the 19th century, while Russia and the U.S. were relatively isolated from each other, this incompatibility did not automatically produce rivalry. Only after the technological progress and globalization of international relations lead these two powers to close quarters in a new, single world, did this happen. The process of reproduction of the incompatible identities, through foreign policy practices, was equally at work during the "reset" period. This will be shown by a comparative analysis of two important programmatic documents which were adopted at the height of this period. I am referring to: National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, adopted in May 2009 — a month after the first Obama-Medvedev meeting in London; and National Security Strategy of the United States, adopted in May 2010, soon after the two presidents signed the New START in Prague.

Why these two documents? Because by looking at both states' domestic and foreign policy programmatic documents, it can be concluded that the Strategies occupy the highest position in their respective hierarchy. This way they serve as the best empirical material whose analysis can determine the presence of specific reproduction of national identities in the United States and Russia's foreign policies. It can be added that this is the first genuine effort undertaken to analyze the U.S. and Russia's security strategy comparatively. Currently, there are only separate analyses of either Russia's, or U.S. strategy, and how they compare to the previous documents of the same type in each country also. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis of different states' strategic documents is not new.⁴

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the first chapter, the performative theory's basic assumptions are outlined, and then is shown how Campbell himself applied them to the case of the constitution and reproduction of U.S. identity. Then the same theory is applied to the case of Russia, with a

⁴ The best example is Berenskoetter's comparative analysis of U.S. and European security strategy. See Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter, "Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 71–92.

little help from the works of the authors who deal with Russian national identity. The first chapter is concluded with a table in which the incompatibilities of the two countries' identities are comparatively displayed. In the second chapter, after a short introduction with the basic information on each of the documents, a comparative analysis of the national security strategies of Russia and the U.S. is carried out, regarding the three aspects of their contents: values, threats and means. This analysis points to the congruence of the Strategies' contents with an already present pattern of incompatible identities reproduction, outlined in the first chapter. In Conclusion, we underline our basic argument that the Strategies are yet another stage in the reproduction of Russia and U.S. incompatible identities; hence, from the performative theory's viewpoint, it was natural to expect that their practical application would also lead to a failure of this rapprochement attempt. The ending paragraph of the paper presents the conditions needed for this incompatibility of the identities to be overcome in the future, so that the establishment of a real partnership and friendly relations between the United States and Russia becomes possible.

Foreign policy of the United States and Russia from the performative theory's perspective — the practice of reproduction of incompatible national identities

Basic assumptions of performative theory. According to Campbell, foreign policy is a distinct practice of drawing boundaries between “inside” and “outside”, “self” and “other”, as well as “domestic” and “foreign”, in the name of the constitution and reproduction of state identity.⁵ In foreign policy documents, this identity is being constantly “written” and “rewritten”.⁶ Contrary to traditional understanding, the identity of a state is not pre-given, but is constituted performatively⁷ in relation to difference and threat (which are themselves constituted related to identity): to know who we are, we should know who we are not, and what we should be afraid of.⁸ Foreign policy is the

⁵ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1992, p. 8.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁷ “Performatively” means that “discourses constitute the objects of which they speak”. This way performative theory is different to social constructivism, because it puts an emphasis to materialization instead of construction, giving equal importance to both ideational and material side of the discourse, which interact with each other through the continuous process of “citation and recitation”. Bialasiewicz, Luiza et al, “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy”, *Political Geography*, 26, 2007, pp. 406-408.

⁸ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, op. cit, p. 54.

central practice here, for it operates with “discourse of danger”. This discourse is about interpreting threats to identity which emanate from the alternative models of behavior⁹ (both from the outside and the inside) as if they are exclusively external dangers which justify the existence of state, for it is the only actor capable of confronting these dangers.¹⁰ Thus foreign policy is a “double exclusionary” practice: “domestic enemies” — which means social elements on the inside that are holders of these alternative interpretations of identity — are linked to the foreign actors capable of endangering us physically.¹¹ The boundaries inscribed this way are not purely territorial, but ideational at the same time. Over time they (as well as the identity) get fixed and are later reproduced as such. However, this is a never-ending process, for the absence of threats to identity would render the existence of a state as the mechanism for its protection senseless.¹² Should a state reach absolute security, it would cease to exist, for the challenges which justify the existence of authority and the fields in which its use of force is legitimate would be overcome.¹³ On the other hand, the less stable the identity is and the more blurred its boundaries are, the greater is the need for foreign policy,¹⁴ which necessarily contains a moral element — “self” is presented as superior to the “other” in terms of morality and civilisation.¹⁵ If foreign policy fails to play this role, “we” are in danger of becoming like “them”.¹⁶ Nevertheless, constitution and reproduction of identity through foreign policy do not have the same contents in every state, because not

⁹ “The mere existence of the alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be *the* true identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat”. Ibid, p. 3.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 75.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 71.

¹² “...states are never finished as entities... (they are) in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death”. Ibid, p. 11.

¹³ “The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is thus not a threat to a state’s identity or existence; it is its condition of possibility”. Ibid, p. 12.

¹⁴ “The principal impetus behind the location of threats in the external realm comes from the fact that the sovereign domain, for all its identification as a well-ordered and rational entity, is as much a site of ambiguity and indeterminacy as the anarchic realm it is distinguished from”. Ibid, p. 70.

¹⁵ Ibid, pp. 85, 100. “The spaces of inside and outside serve to delineate the rational, ordered polity in which good, sane, sober, modest, and civilized ‘man’ resides, from the dangerous, chaotic and the anarchical realm in which the evil, mad, drunk, arrogant, and savage people are found”. (pp. 67-68).

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 66.

all of them lack prediscursive foundations to the same extent, nor do they face the same challenges during this process. This is shown with the examples of the United States and Russia.

Identity and foreign policy of the United States. “No state possesses a prediscursive, stable identity... Yet for no state is this condition as central as it is for America. If all states are ‘imagined communities’, devoid of ontological being apart from the many and varied practices which constitute their reality, then America is the imagined community *par excellence*. For there never has been a country called ‘America’, nor a people known as ‘Americans’, from whom a national identity is drawn. There is a United States of America, and there are many who declare themselves to be ‘Americans’... but ‘America’ only exists by virtue of people coming to live in a particular place... more than any other state, the imprecise process of imagination is what constitutes American identity. In this context, the practices of ‘foreign policy’ come to have a special importance. If the identity of the ‘true nationals’ remains intrinsically elusive and inorganic, it can only be secured by an effective and continual ideological demarcation of those who are ‘false’ to the defining ideals”.¹⁷ By this, Campbell says that not every country is an “imagined community” to an equal extent, without any foundation of national identity which precedes its practices. The United States is the leader in this sense. This explains an extraordinary fragility of its identity and a chronic need for delineation from the “other” in relation to what America is in an ideological sense.¹⁸

This kind of logic has its roots in the very historical beginnings of America. Columbus did not “discover” America, for he had neither the intention to discover something which would be called America, nor did he encounter the land that had something “American” in its nature.¹⁹ America was not discovered, but imagined afterwards “as the land of opportunities, of the future, and of freedom”.²⁰ Europeans, Spaniards and Christians, by separating their “self” from the Indian American “other”, brought with them to the New World the relation towards difference and the “other” which had been present in the Old World.²¹ Depending on the quality of the difference perception (was it a more bridgeable dichotomy Christendom/paganism, or a greater civilization/barbarism gap?), strategies of

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 105.

¹⁸ Or, as Michael Camen argues: “Only in a country where it is so unclear what is American... do people worry so much about the threat of things ‘un-American’”. Quoted in Ibid, p. 105.

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 106-107.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 110.

²¹ Ibid, p. 111. “Because the ‘Europe’ of this period was a multiple acephalous federation secured by the transcendental authority of Christendom, the hierarchy of Christian/pagan was the most pervasive organizing principle for difference”. (p. 115).

colonization and enslavement were alternately applied towards the native population.²² The first settlers in the territory of the contemporary United States — Anglo-Saxon Puritans — arrived in the 17th century, bringing with them to the New World an especially malignant version of the civilization/barbarism dichotomy, first applied by the English in their treatment of the Irish.²³ In a new environment, they based their fragile (and, by geographical departure from known European society, additionally endangered) identity on the ideal of closed and well-ordered Christian community, which would endure even after it transformed itself into a “merchant-dominated civil polity”.²⁴ Given that they considered the natives, North-American Indians, as too distant from this ideal, they could apply only the most extreme measures of separation towards them. “Extermination, rather than colonization or enslavement, was the early English response to otherness. When this could not be achieved, physical separation was employed”.²⁵ Strict delineation of the English from the Indians indicates that there is not a naturally sharp distinction between them, but rather a vague one. When the boundaries are blurred, barriers are repeatedly erected.²⁶ This is why the Puritans brutally treated those members of their own society who would get too close to the Indian way of life in any sense, departing from the pre-established ideal, and thus calling into question the homogeneity of the society (witch hunts are a fair example).²⁷

When threats to identity decrease, the complete otherness relaxes. This way Indians were considered less hostile over time, but many other “others” took their place, because “the boundary between inside and outside, self and other, is never static nor is it singular”.²⁸ The pattern of identity reproduction, similar to the one established by the first settlers, can be observed through the whole of U.S. history. It is characterized by “evangelism of fear”, by which the boundaries between the

²² *Ibid*, p. 116.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 119. Although the Irish were also Christians (Catholics), the English did not consider them as such, because they regarded them as being uncivilized. “The English experience in Ireland indicated a disposition amongst the Protestants to take any margin of difference and transform it into a condition of complete otherness, regardless (or perhaps because of) the lack of distance between the self and the qualities of the other... when the other is rigidly demarcated it more often than not signals the existence of a fragile, endangered and insecure self. That the English in Ireland subverted the Christianity of the Gaels and transformed it into evidence of paganism and barbarism said much about their inability to affirm their own identity without violence... the extreme Protestantism of the English in Ireland was unmistakable in the Puritanism of the Pilgrims in America”. (p. 120).

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 121.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 125.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 126.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 121.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 128.

“outside” and “inside” are drawn, internal threats are linked to the external ones — all with the purpose of disciplining the members of one’s own society.²⁹ At the time of gaining independence, the revolutionaries’ need for ideological distinction from the English additionally aggravated the fragility and vulnerability of their identity.³⁰ Americans greeted the French Revolution as an expression of pursuit for freedom from a monarchical tyranny, but were also suspicious of it, for they considered it as a threat to their moderate constitutional political experiment.³¹ Whenever domestic divisions become more pronounced, one side will accuse the other of connections with foreign countries and treason.³² The “slave codes” were in fact about disciplining the non-slaves, rather than slaves.³³

To understand how this logic works in the United States today, it is important to gain understanding of the Cold War period in an appropriate way. The Cold War was only “another episode in the on-going production and reproduction of American identity through the practices of foreign policy, rather than as simply an externally induced crisis”.³⁴ Contrary to traditional understanding, the key problem was not the need to deal with the Soviet military threat. The Soviet threat was mainly political, because the Soviet Union promoted a social model opposed to private property, which in the U.S. serves as a criterion for separation between civilized and barbaric, i.e. normal from pathological.³⁵ Although the U.S. came out of the Second World War as the most powerful country, its identity was endangered by the existence of social groups which supported alternative interpretations, and whose actions used to be linked with the Soviet Union, although it was “neither the source nor the ally of these domestic challenges”.³⁶ U.S. foreign policy documents from the beginning of the Cold War refer to the purpose of the United States, its ideology, culture, qualities of its society, instead of simply dealing with necessity to counter the Soviet threat.³⁷ Expressing the necessity to protect American values, these documents “always acknowledged that their initial concern was the absence

²⁹ Ibid, p. 131.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 136.

³¹ Ibid, p. 138.

³² In the mentioned period the accusation of being a French agent was common. Ibid, p. 139.

³³ Ibid, p. 130.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 145.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 159. “In the context of the United States, then, identity has often been disciplined by rhetoric associated with freedom of choice for individuals, democratic institutions, and private enterprise economy. This serves to reproduce those practices in the face of contradictory and threatening interpretations; most obviously, that of a communal identity the interests of which are served by social planning and the public ownership of property... communism and the Soviet Union are not synonymous. The former predates and exceeds the latter”. (pp. 158–159).

³⁶ Ibid, p. 160.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 158.

of order, the potential for anarchy, and the fear of totalitarian forces or other negative elements which would exploit or foster such conditions”.³⁸ This explains why the United States, even after the Soviet military threat had disappeared, retained and additionally emphasized the priority of building the international order based on American values and under the leadership of the U.S. In recent strategic documents, an emphasis has been put on integration, which means the attraction and inclusion of other states into the American sphere of influence. Those actors who refuse to accept the American design for the international order, get excluded.³⁹ The new stage in reproduction of American identity requires new enemies. The war against terrorism is only a re-run of the Cold War in the sense of “zero-sum analyses of international action, the sense of endangerment ascribed to all the activities of the other, the fear of internal challenge and subversion, the tendency to militarize all responses, and the willingness to draw the lines between us and them.”⁴⁰

The analysis of the foreign policy practices of the United States shows that they are a constant process of reproduction of one *par excellence* imagined community’s identity. This process now manifests itself as the pursuit for leadership in the integrated international order, based on the values of American homogenous society, to the exclusion of all domestic and foreign actors who offer alternative interpretations: “In the history of U.S. foreign policy — regardless of the radically different contexts in which it has operated — the formalized practices and ritualized acts of security discourse have worked to produce a conception of the United States

³⁸ David Campbell, “Contradictions of a Lone Superpower”, Internet, http://www.david-campbell.org/wp-content/documents/Contradictions_of_a_Lone_Superpower.pdf 27/8/2012, p. 226. The NSC-68 document from 1950 says, among other things, that the purpose of the United States as nation is “to ensure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual... There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom... and the idea of slavery... The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles”. However, there is not only concern about the Soviet threat: “In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check Kremlin design, for the absence of order is becoming less and less tolerable... One is a policy which we would probably pursue *even if there were no Soviet threat*. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of ‘containing’ the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact with each other”. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, op. cit, p. 25 (emphasis added).

³⁹ Bialasiewicz, Luiza et al, “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy”, op. cit, p. 409.

⁴⁰ David Campbell, “Time Is Broken: The Return of the Past in the Response to September 11”, Internet, http://www.david-campbell.org/wp-content/documents/Time_is_broken.pdf 27/8/2012, pp. 7–8. “What we are witnessing, therefore, is an emerging form of strategic international McCharthyism. Struggles unrelated to the global threat will nonetheless be cast as compradors of international terrorism, repressive policies will not be questioned, and those that dare criticize this complicity will be labeled fellow travelers of the terrorists”. (p. 8).

in which freedom, liberty, law, democracy, individualism, faith, order, prosperity and civilization are claimed to exist because of the constant struggle with an often violent suppression of opponents said to embody tyranny, oppression, anarchy, totalitarianism, collectivism, atheism, and barbarism”.⁴¹

Identity and foreign policy of Russia. Campbell used the case study of U.S. foreign policy to present the application of his performative theory. To apply it to the case of Russian foreign policy, already available analyses of Russian national identity can be put to use. The most prominent among these analyses is the one published by Andrei P. Tsygankov.⁴² Unlike the United States, Russia can not be labelled as the imagined community *par excellence*, given that in its case there is a “Russian people” (in the meaning of ethnic group) as a foundation of national identity which precedes the establishment of the modern Russian state. However, this foundation is very loose, considering that Russia has existed as a multi-national empire since its liberation from Mongol occupation. “Russian tsars rarely appealed to the notion of a Russian people to legitimate their rule”, says Ponsard; because of this, the Russian nation later had difficulty in developing a post-imperial identity.⁴³ An example of a possible ambiguity regarding Russian national identity is the difference made in the Russian language between *rossiskii* (which refers to the land of Russia) and *russkii* (which refers to Russians as an ethnic group).⁴⁴ The primacy of the former is present throughout the whole history of the modern Russian state, including the contemporary period of the Russian (*Rossiskoi*) Federation.⁴⁵ To use the language of performative theory — the boundaries of Russian national identity got fixed over time as boundaries of a multi-national identity, while practices of exclusion do not refer to exclusions based on ethnic background.⁴⁶ This is the reason

⁴¹ David Campbell, “The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire and the Sports Utility Vehicle”, Internet, http://www.david-campbell.org/wp-content/documents/Biopolitics_of_Security.pdf 27/8/2012 , p. 948.

⁴² See Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Plymouth, 2010.

⁴³ “...though the empire was incapable of satisfying Russia’s national feelings, the Russian national consciousness remained fused to the empire... the link between Russia’s national development and this empire-consciousness remains a fundamental characteristic of Russian national psychology”. Lionel Ponsard, *Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap*, Routledge, 2007, p. 19.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 20.

⁴⁵ “Throughout their history, ethnic Russians have identified themselves mainly with the state – the Russian empire or the Soviet Union. Thus they acquired what is often described as an ‘imperial mentality’”. *Ibid*, p. 20.

⁴⁶ “What Russian geography has taught us is that the immensity of the Russian territory, stretching from Europe to Asia, and the consequent heterogeneity of that territory and the people living there, has been the ground for an identity that includes *the consciousness of*

why foreign policy documents of Russia, among other things, insist on a multi-national character of the state as one of the main distinguishing features of Russia.

If ethnic divisions are not the basis for exclusion (in relation to the “outside”, as well as to alternative domestic elements), then what is? For the United States, there are specific values mentioned above. What are the key values which determine Russia’s identity? Tsygankov says there are three schools of thought in modern history of Russia, which view the basic values differently: Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists. “Westernizers placed the emphasis on Russia’s similarity with the West and viewed the West as the most viable and progressive civilization in the World... Statists have emphasized the state’s ability to govern and preserve the social and political order... Critical to Statism is the notion of external threat to Russia’s security. Ever since the two-century-long conquest by the Mongols, Russians have developed a psychological complex of insecurity and the readiness to sacrifice everything for independence and sovereignty... The Statists, however, are not inherently anti-Western; they merely seek the West’s recognition by putting the emphasis on economic and military capabilities... Finally, Civilizationists have always seen Russian values as different from those of the West, and they have always attempted to spread Russian values abroad, outside the West”.⁴⁷ As a social constructivist, Tsygankov sees in the West the “significant other”, which decisively influences the Russian interpretation of its own identity.⁴⁸ He notes that in the middle of the 1990’s the Westernizers gave way to the Statists, as a result of Western actions which “strengthened the sense that the West was not accepting Russia as one of its own”.⁴⁹ The question which Tsygankov nonetheless does not adequately answer, is why the tide never turned more significantly in favor of Westernizers or Civilizationists. In spite of radical changes in context, the Statist conception remains dominant in Russia, including today.⁵⁰ Performative theory can solve this.

plurality and the acceptance of differences. In other words, the Russian identity cannot be that of the Russian people in its ethnic sense only; it must embrace a dimension that is broad enough for all the inhabitants of the Russian territory to identify themselves with”. The coexistence of the terms *russkii* i *rossiskii* testifies that Russian national identity is “more inclusive than exclusive”, thus it is not national in a full sense, but multi-national. Ibid, p. 31 (emphasis added).

⁴⁷ Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, op. cit, pp. 4–7.

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 15–17.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 19. “What often determines Moscow’s foreign policy choices is whether or not the West’s international actions are perceived by Russian officials as accepting Russia as an equal and legitimate member of the world”. (p. 1).

⁵⁰ What is striking is that, whenever governing elites in Russia embrace some universalistic ideology (whether “Third Rome” Christianity, or world socialist revolution, or liberal international order), such development is only temporary, and the trend soon gets reversed toward a pragmatic foreign policy based on *raison d’etat*.

The Statists' dominance in contemporary Russia's foreign policy thought and practice is the result of fixing the boundaries of Russian identity in a way which means the supreme role of the strong state in securing all other values from numerous challenges.⁵¹ The seriousness of the Russian view of these challenges is understandable if geographic location and historical tradition are considered.⁵² As in the U.S. case, the spatial element plays an important role in the formation of Russian identity as well. The difference is that, while the United States emerged by moving to the New World, Russia positioned itself at a wide and insecure Eurasian crossroads.⁵³ If Russia was not a great power capable of having an independent foreign policy and participating in managing the world on an equal footing with other powers, its identity as the Eurasian and multinational state, even its mere survival, would be in danger.⁵⁴ In Russia's recent foreign policy documents and

⁵¹ "During most of the twentieth century, Russian identity continued to be based on the international power of the state". Lionel Ponsard, *Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap*, op. cit, p. 19.

⁵² "As a borderland nation in an uncertain, often volatile external environment, Russia had to continuously respond to similar challenges to its security. These challenges included unrests in neighboring territories, threats of external invasion, and difficulties in preserving internal state integrity". Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, op. cit, p. 4.

⁵³ "A continuous sense of occupying some kind of critical middle ground between highly differentiated zones of global civilisation has been pervasive in Russia since the reforms of Peter the Great... In this context, Russia's geographical position is a fundamental factor in the Russians' sense that they are different — not part of the European family or the West, but surely not part of Asia either". Lionel Ponsard, *Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap*, op. cit, p. 8.

⁵⁴ Russians see even the Cold War as a struggle for preservation of their own sovereignty and independence from the expansionist ambitions of the West. Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2009, p. 48. Tsygankov at many places cites Russian statesmen for the recent period, who (regardless of context and their personal ideological orientation) underline the necessity of Russia's status as a strong and independent power, treated as such by others (the West above else), in order to preserve its survival and uniqueness. Check several examples. Kozyrev: "...it appears that some Western politicians, in Washington and elsewhere, envision Russia not as an equal partner but as a junior partner. In this view a 'good Russian' is always a follower, never a leader". (the article in *New York Times* from 1994, quoted in Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, op. cit, p. 68). Primakov: "Russia is both Europe and Asia, and this geopolitical location continues to play a tremendous role in formulation of its foreign policy... Geopolitical values are constants that cannot be abolished by historical developments". (from the first official press conference as foreign minister, p. 93). Putin: "Such a country as Russia can survive and develop within the existing borders only if it stays as a great power. During all of its times of weakness... Russia was invariably confronted with the threat of disintegration". (addressing Federation Council in 2003, p. 129). Putin: "For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly that should be gotten rid of... they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change". (the article in *Nezavisimaya gazeta* from 1999,

practice, there is a constant insistence on a collective management of the multipolar world, with Russia as one of the poles. Regardless of changes in the context of Russia-West relations, members of the Russian foreign policy elite have such a vision of their country's role on their minds all the time. Thus Russia's readiness in the 2009-2011 period to improve its relations with the United States must be understood not as a simple reaction to America's "reset" offer, but as its attempt to exploit an opportunity to accomplish the objective it constantly has — to establish partnership with the Western powers on an equal footing. In this it sees the only way to create a secure environment for its domestic development.⁵⁵ The latest series of Russia's criticisms of the West does not mean that Russia pursues an anti-Western policy, but rather its desire to "re-engage with the West on terms that the Kremlin viewed comfortable".⁵⁶

All domestic and foreign actors who, in the view of the Russian foreign policy elite, can jeopardize Russia's great power status, its independent domestic development and foreign policy, its multi-national character, as well as multipolar character of international order, are those "other", "foreign", "barbaric" elements in relation to which Russia performatively constitutes and reproduces its identity, through the foreign policy practices of exclusion. An alternative to a successful foreign policy would be either the complete disintegration of the state, or (more probably) its reduction to narrower national frames and the loss of the great power status. What remains to be discussed is what happens when such foreign policy practices of Russia and the United States, in service of their fundamentally different and at the same time vulnerable identities, face each other in a globalized world.

The incompatibility of the United States and Russia's identity. The main characteristics of the U.S. and Russia's identity are summed up in Table 1.

The table shows the incompatibility of the two states' identities in several respects. As foreign policy is the central practice of constitution and reproduction of one state's identity through the discourse of danger, it is natural that the two states with such incompatible identities repeatedly see each other as a threat. Over time, this threat materializes, while globalization only intensifies

p. 131). Putin: "Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today". (the Munich speech from 2007, p. 171). We would like to add that the insecurity of Russian identity is not as acute as in the case of the U.S. identity. Here there is Russian people (as an ethnic group) that could serve as a foundation of some smaller, Russian nation-state. In such case, however, Russia would not be more than one among many European nation-states.

⁵⁵ For Putin, "the most important national interest lay in Russia's modernization and economic growth, not balancing American influences in the world". *Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

Table 1.

	The United States	Russia
Spatial element	Moving to the New World	Positioning at the Eurasian crossroads
Prediscursive foundation	Non-existent. Instead of it, Puritan ideal of society	Russian people as ethnic group. Subordinate to imperial mentality
Character of society	Homogenous society — denial of differences	Multi-national society — life with differences
Basic value	Individualism and the institutions based on it	Strong and independent state as a precondition of all other values
View of its place in the world	Leadership in the integrated world	One among several great powers in the multipolar world
View of the world's values	Universal values	Pluralism and competition of values

this process, additionally endangering fragile identities. Therefore it is not strange that Russia and the United States have been in a cold war for most of the last hundred years.⁵⁷

Constituting itself as a *par excellence* imagined community by moving to the New World, and lacking any prediscursive foundation (besides the Puritan ideal of social order), the United States exists as a homogenous society which denies domestic ethnic divisions. It draws boundaries towards the “other” above all ideologically, according to the commitment to the supreme value of individualism and the institutions based on it (private property, free market, constitutionalism, democracy, etc.). Considering that the U.S. is accustomed to introducing order in the New World (thanks to the privilege of having weak neighbors and the capability of isolating themselves from the Old World “disorder”), its first concern since the technological progress and globalization removed the barrier between the two worlds, is to destroy anarchy and establish world order. The United States does not see any other option for its survival in the contemporary world, than to be its leader, by integrating it according to universal (in fact, American) values. As an alternative to its leadership, the U.S. sees anarchy which is not manageable. Anarchy is fed by the mere existence of other independent great powers, as well as by any deviation in values from the universal model.

⁵⁷ When I say “cold war”, I do not only think of a period of the United States and Soviet Union’s global competition, which is known in history as Cold War. The phrase “cold war” originally meant a coexistence and rivalry between the societies with conflicting identities. It was first used by a Spanish fourteen-century writer for the relation between the Christians and Arabs. David Campbell, “Contradictions of a Lone Superpower”, op. cit, p. 227.

On the other hand, Russia does not have the privilege of moving to the New World. It is positioned in the two main parts of the Old World — Europe and Asia. Having an imperative of preserving its survival, it has learned to live with differences on the inside (as a multi-national state, despite the prediscursive foundation it has in the Russian people) and the anarchy on the outside (as one of several great powers in a multipolar world, in which there is a pluralism of values). To participate in the collective management of the world, and at the same time to defend its uniqueness, Russia has to be a strong and independent state. In a unipolar world, where universal values are imposed from a single center, Russia could not survive with this identity; it would at least be reduced to the rank of one of the many nation-states which are mere followers of the world leader. Russia's encounter with the United States in a globalized world caused a problem which has not yet been resolved — how could a typical power of the New World and a typical power of the Old World fit together in a single world, each preserving its own identity?

Given the above mentioned materialization of a mutual threat, it would be very difficult. The listed incompatibilities indicate that the two countries threaten each others' identity on multiple levels. Russia bothers the United States for what it is, what it stands for, and how it behaves on the international stage. Russian insistence on a strong state collides with American individualism, and Russia's multi-national character is the opposite to the homogeneity of American society. The incompatibility of domestic values would not be such a big problem if Russia was not an example of how a state can be successful, well-governed, and a great power, while respecting values opposed to the American ethos.⁵⁸ In fact, what annoys Americans above all is that Russia plays the role of an independent great power which supports the collective management of a multipolar world, as well as a pluralism of values, which is the opposite to the American aspiration of being a leader in a world order based on universal values.⁵⁹ This acceptance of multipolarity and pluralism of values is what differentiates Russia's approach towards the United States from U.S. approach towards Russia. Russia is bothered neither by U.S. status of an independent great power, nor by its appreciation of

⁵⁸ One of the recent events is an example of the externalization of the threat – linking the proponents of alternative ideas to foreign actors — which is elaborated in performative theory. It is the case of Julian Assange, who hosted the talk show on *RT*, Russian TV in English language. After the first episode of the show (his guest was Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah), he was denounced as “Kremlin agent”. “Smear and Loathing: Assange show FSB-filmed Putin propaganda”, *RT*, 18 April 2012, Internet, <http://rt.com/news/assange-world-tomorrow-reaction-360/11/9/2012>.

⁵⁹ The reason for which the United States sees Russia as an oponent which does not deserve an equal treatment is clear to Tsygankov: “led by President Putin the country is attempting to conduct an independent foreign policy while continuing to differ from the United States internally”. Andrey P. Tsygankov, *Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy*, op. cit, p. 59.

different values. It is only bothered by U.S. pursuit of unipolarity and universalism, together with the denial of independence and the different values of all others,⁶⁰ which is a threat to Russia's place on the world's stage, as well as to its internal order of values.⁶¹

It remains to be demonstrated how the most recent national security strategies of the United States and Russia serve in the reproduction of these states' incompatible identities. It is part of the explanation why the latest attempt at rapprochement between the two powers was condemned to failure.

The comparative analysis of national security strategies of Russia and the United States

Medvedev and Obama strategies. National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020 is a much larger and more complex document compared to its predecessors — national security concepts from 1997 and 2001.⁶² The draft of the Strategy was done by an interdepartmental working group, under the supervision of Security Council. In March 2009, the aims and principles of the Strategy were presented to Security Council by President Medvedev and Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev. After some changes, the Strategy was approved in a closed session in April, to be confirmed by President Medvedev's decree in May 2009.⁶³ The new strategy has much more of an "upbeat tone" than the previous documents; instead of the "narrative of victimhood", it expresses the confidence of the Russian elite regarding Russia's ability to influence the world. It also anticipates a change in the decision-making process, for it provides for a long-term unified approach to strategic aims (to 2020) under the supervision of Security Council Secretary, who

⁶⁰ Sergei Lavrov: "As regards the content of the new stage in humankind's development, there are two basic approaches to it among the countries. The first one holds that the world must gradually become a Greater West through the adoption of Western values. It is a kind of 'the end of history'. The other approach — advocated by Russia — holds that competition is becoming truly global and acquiring a civilizational dimension; that is, the subject of competition now includes values and development models". Sergei Lavrov, "Russia and the World in the 21st Century", *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 3, July-September 2008, Internet, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_11291 11/9/2012.

⁶¹ Fear of American exclusiveness regarding the values forces the governing elite in Russia to externalize the threats itself by denouncing political opponents from opposition parties and NGO sector (who support ideas alternative to the Statist school of thought) as "foreign agents". "Russian parliament adopts NGO 'foreign agents' bill", *BBC*, 13 July 2012, Internet, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18826661> 11/9/2012.

⁶² Keir Giles, "Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020", Internet, <http://www.conflictstudies.org.uk/files/RusNatSecStrategyto2020.pdf> 23/4/2012, p. 1.

⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 2.

is a close associate of then Prime Minister (now President) Putin.⁶⁴ It can be assumed that Putin, decisively influencing the adoption of the Strategy, planned his return and a long stay in the position of President.⁶⁵

Unlike Russia's, U.S. (Obama's) National Security Strategy from 2010 is certainly not planned to last until the end of the decade, for this document is adopted in the United States more often. Namely, Obama's strategy follows the trend of the two previous — issued by President Bush in 2002 and 2006 — by its adoption in the second year of the President's mandate.⁶⁶ To deflect from Bush's approach, Obama's strategy puts an accent on engagement with other countries, with the objective of renewing American leadership.⁶⁷ Its tone, compared to Bush's strategy, is less direct, populist and provocative, and more reflexive and abstract.⁶⁸ After its adoption, it provoked ambivalent criticism. It was attacked because it contained the "necessary force" concept (which discharges Bush's pre-emptive self-defense), which is claimed to leave much more space for unilateral use of force.⁶⁹ On the other hand, militant circles attack it because it is allegedly based on: undermining American sovereignty — trust in international organizations, emphasizing soft power, a more humble attitude towards others, and a more restrained American role on the international stage.⁷⁰

Though I have said that Russia's Strategy is a much larger and more advanced document than its predecessors (which is partly expressed by replacement of the word "concept" by the word "strategy"), and the U.S. one mitigates direct and populist and emphasizes a more abstract tone, it does not reduce the gap between the two documents which is obvious at first sight. The U.S. Strategy is far more complex than Russia's (it has three times more text),

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 11.

⁶⁵ Which does not mean it is not congruent with Medvedev's political course. Marcel De Haas says that Russia's strategic documents from 2000 on show the consistence in thought and practice of Putin and Medvedev. Marcel De Haas, "Russian Security Policy and Cooperation with the West (ARI)", Internet, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/riecano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari97-201023/4/2012, pp. 2–3.

⁶⁶ See *National Security Strategy Archive*, Internet, <http://nssarchive.us/> 12/9/2012.

⁶⁷ Christine Gray, "President Obama's 2010 United States National Security Strategy and International Law on the Use of Force", *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 2011, pp. 35–36.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 40.

⁶⁹ See Christian Henderson, "The 2010 United States National Security Strategy and the Obama Doctrine of 'Necessary Force'", *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2010, pp. 403–434.

⁷⁰ See Kim R. Holmes and James Jay Carafano, "Defining the Obama Doctrine, Its Pitfalls, and How to Avoid Them", *Backgrounder*, No. 2457, September 1, 2010.

and its tone is much more emotional and direct. We present a detailed comparison of the two documents in three respects, by simplification of the list of questions that David Baldwin uses in his security concept⁷¹: *values* — what has to be protected, whether it is in possession, or is required; *threats* — what jeopardizes values, whether it is currently present, or can appear in the future; *means* — basic instruments and partners needed for the protection of values from threats. Berenskoetter uses a similar pattern in the above mentioned analysis, except for the fact that he speaks about the “realm of responsibility” instead of values.⁷²

Values. That institutions based on individualism are the supreme value which determines U.S. identity, unlike the strong and independent state as a precondition of all other values in the case of Russia, is obvious from the specific words in their respective Strategies. While words such as “market”, “human rights”, “rule of law”, and “democracy”, are more frequent in the American document, the Russian one makes use mainly of words like “sovereignty”, “territorial integrity”, and “independence”. The gap between the American vision of world order based on universal values under U.S. leadership, and the Russian vision of a collectively governed multipolar world in which there is competition of values, is also apparent from the repetitive use of the abovementioned words. The American Strategy is dominated by expressions like “leadership”, “universal rights”, “international system/order/community”; while the Russian Strategy by “multipolar”, “balance of power”, “equal security”, and “strategic stability”.

Both Strategies list values explicitly. The Russian Strategy already does it in the first article of the first chapter, listing: freedom and independence of the Russian state, humanism, peace between peoples and cultural unity of Russia’s multi-national population, respect for family traditions, and patriotism.⁷³ This shows the emphasis on important characteristics of Russia’s identity mentioned above: devotion to the state and its independence as well as its multi-national character. The Strategy devotes a special place to the state in preservation of cultural and moral values by “strengthening the spiritual unity of multi-national population” and “international image of Russia as a state of rich traditional and dynamically developing contemporary culture”.⁷⁴ As culture is more elaborated

⁷¹ Baldwin’s questions are: security for whom?; for which values?; how much security?; from which threats?; by what means?; at what cost?; in what time period? David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security”, *Review of International Studies*, 23, 1997, pp. 12-18.

⁷² Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter, “Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies”, op. cit, p. 73.

⁷³ *Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года*, Internet, <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1/99.html> 12/9/2012, I(1).

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, IV(7(84)).

in the Russian than in the American Strategy, it can be concluded that Russia, in the richness of its culture, sees one of the main distinguishing features in relation to the rest of the world, in which “values and models of development have become the subject of global competition”.⁷⁵

On the other hand, the United States lists three main values — democracy, human rights, and rule of law — as “essential sources of our strength and influence in the world”,⁷⁶ strongly emphasizing their universal character. “Respect for universal values at home and around the world” is listed as one of the four enduring American interests,⁷⁷ for “our long-term security and prosperity depends on our steady support for universal values, which sets us apart from our enemies... and many potential competitors for influence”.⁷⁸ This is an explicit inscription of the identity boundary. It is worth adding that this Strategy supports efforts within Russia to promote universal values.⁷⁹

From the explicit lists of values in the Strategies, it can be concluded that the United States insists on universalism (what is good for America is good for the world, including Russia); while Russia emphasizes particularity (the need to protect its uniqueness). This is in line with our understanding of performative constitution and reproduction of the two states’ identities.

As far as values in a broader sense are concerned (those that are not explicitly listed as “values” in the Strategies), there is a difference between what is already owned from what is desired. (National) interests include both. The Russian Strategy defines national interests as the “totality of the internal and external needs of the state in providing the protection and stable development of the individual, society, and the state”.⁸⁰ This is an application of the contemporary security concept, which does not insist exclusively on the security of the state, but on the individual and society as objects of security. The national interests of Russia are: “development of democracy and civil society, the advancement of the competitiveness of the national economy... ensuring the immutability of the constitutional system, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the Russian Federation... transforming the Russian Federation into a world power whose activity is aimed at supporting strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnerships in conditions of the multipolar world”.⁸¹ As it can be seen,

⁷⁵ *Ibid*, II(8).

⁷⁶ *National Security Strategy*, Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 12/9/2012 , p. 2.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 7.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p. 36.

⁷⁹ *Ibid*, p. 44.

⁸⁰ *Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года*, op. cit, I(6).

⁸¹ *Ibid*, III(21).

democracy is not totally omitted from the list of Russian values. Quite the contrary, it is promoted to the rank of the first national interest, in a form of desired objective. This way, the authors of the Strategy implicitly admit that democracy in Russia has not yet been developed to the extent it should be. However, insistence on strengthening the state and its economy on the inside, and strategic stability on the outside, indicates that these interests cannot be achieved separately — some foreign support to democracy and civil society at the expense of the other two interests is not allowed. National interests are superior to strategic priorities (national defense, state and social security),⁸² and priorities of stable development (quality of life, economic growth, science, technology, education, health, culture, ecology, equal strategic partnership, and strategic stability).⁸³ “Development” and “quality of life” are expressions encountered more frequently in the Russian rather than the American Strategy, which is understandable given the fact that Russia is far below the desired level (as well as the American) in these areas.

The United States divides its interests into four groups: the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system; respect for universal values at home and around the world; an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity to meet global challenges.⁸⁴ This shows a general tendency towards universalism, erasing the boundary between national and global interests. “And when national interests do collide — or countries prioritize their interests in different ways — those nations that defy international norms or fail to meet their sovereign responsibilities will be denied the incentives that come with greater integration and collaboration with the international community”.⁸⁵ In other words, those who exercise their own national interests in a way which is not compatible with the American view of global interests are punished by exclusion from the “international community”. This is Campbell’s concept of integration and exclusion in practice. Unlike the Russian insistence on defense of territorial integrity, state borders, and sovereignty, the United States hardly pays attention to these issues,⁸⁶ because it has regarded its territory secure since a long time ago (except from nuclear or terrorist threats and/or attacks). On the other hand, much more space is devoted to areas of internal

⁸² Ibid, III(23).

⁸³ Ibid, III(24).

⁸⁴ *National Security Strategy*, op. cit, p. 7.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 40.

⁸⁶ In the U.S. Strategy sovereignty and territorial integrity are mentioned only once — interestingly, in the sense of support to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors. Ibid, p. 44.

security: science, education, health, environment, etc. (except culture, which is more important for Russians, as it appears).

The analysis of listed national interests approves the conclusion that particularity is dominant in the Russian Strategy, unlike universalism in the American one. Russia is not reserved regarding the respect for interests of others, while the United States underrates other states' interests which are not compatible to its own (i.e. universal ones). This kind of attitude towards others corresponds to the division between civilization and barbarism — it seems as if the United States knows better what is good for other countries, than they know what is good for them.

Finally, the analysis of values should encompass the United States and Russia's visions of international (security, legal, economic, etc.) order, and the place they aspire to have in it. This may be the key issue that reflects the incompatibility of the two countries' foreign policies. Russia advocates international relations “on the principles of international law, and on ensuring reliable and equal security for states”,⁸⁷ and should actively participate in construction of the multipolar world.⁸⁸ This shows the incorporation of the elements important for Russia's identity into its foreign policy — Russia cannot be secure unless the multipolar order based on equal security and international law is established. Russia should actively promote this order and transform itself into a world power capable of maintaining strategic stability. The backbone of this equal security should be an “open system of Euro-Atlantic collective security, on a clear treaty and legal basis”.⁸⁹

The United States is straight forward regarding the international order it desires — the one under its leadership. Moreover, the basic motto of the Strategy is “renew leadership”.⁹⁰ Leadership is understood as political, economic, and above all moral. The whole global security depends on it.⁹¹ Like Russia, the United States insists on an international order based on respect for international law, but in a substantially different sense. The Strategy says that the just and sustainable international order has to be “based on rights and responsibilities”, and to be “capable of addressing the problems of our time”.⁹² This is not about positive international norms, but about such international law that, in the American view, could address new problems. Russia and the United States do not have the same international norms in mind,

⁸⁷ *Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года*, op. cit, II(13).

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, III(24).

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, II(16).

⁹⁰ This phrase is used 9 times in the Strategy — the first time on the first page, and the last time in the last sentence.

⁹¹ *National Security Strategy*, op. cit, p. 7.

⁹² *Ibid*, pp. 3, 5.

because they have a different perspective of what the key problems are (I shall deal with this in the next part of this chapter). The order under the American leadership is necessarily unipolar. Thus, other powers are not treated equally, but are offered to be partners in leadership. It is notable that when the American Strategy talks about potential U.S. partners in global leadership, it mentions the regional leadership of several powers (Japan, South Korea, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa). However, when it comes to Russia, the word “leadership” is not used.⁹³

It is clear that these visions of international order collide. American insistence on its leadership as a precondition of global security, and on its own view of international norms and responsibilities (while Russia is not even offered to be partner in this leadership), is at odds with Russia’s vision of itself as a great power in the multipolar world based on clear international legal norms and equal security for all. This conflict of visions is hardly anything more than another stage in an already fixed pattern of reproduction of the two states’ identities.

In conclusion, the values which Russia and the United States want to protect, according to their current national security strategies, are incompatible. Listing these values in their national security strategies is in service of reproduction of the two states’ also incompatible identities.

Threats. The identity of the state is always constituted in relation to difference. The previous part of this chapter pointed out the basic differences between the United States and Russia in terms of their values listed in the Strategies. This part revealed directly the “discourse of danger”, by considering what the Strategies say about the threats to those values. The threats are explicitly listed through consideration of the negative aspects of the current situation, and of what could jeopardize the protected values in the future.⁹⁴

The Russian Strategy defines a threat to national security as “the direct or indirect possibility of inflicting damage to constitutional rights, freedom, decent quality and standard of citizens’ lives, sovereignty and territorial integrity, stable development of the Russian Federation, defense and security of the state”.⁹⁵ Then, concrete threats are cited throughout the whole document. After listing the negative consequences of globalization, which increase the vulnerability of all states in relation to new threats and challenges, it says: “The inadequacy of the current global and regional architecture, oriented, particularly in the North-Atlantic region, only towards NATO, as well as the imperfection of legal instruments and mechanisms, increasingly create a threat to international security provision”.⁹⁶ Among the threats stemming from the

⁹³ Ibid, pp. 42-45.

⁹⁴ The use of the word “threat” has similar frequency in each of the Strategies.

⁹⁵ *Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года*, op. cit, I(6).

⁹⁶ Ibid, II(8).

current general situation in international relations are: “unilateral use of force in international relations”, “disagreements between the main participants in world politics”, “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their fall to the hands of terrorists”, illegal activities in the fields of cybernetics, biology, and high technology, nationalism, xenophobia, separatism, violent extremism, religious radicalism, illegal migrations, drug and human trafficking, other forms of organized crime, epidemics, the fresh water deficit, conflicts in some world regions, struggle for resources, etc.⁹⁷ “The possibility of maintaining global and regional stability will substantially decrease with the deployment in Europe of elements of the global anti-missile defense of the United States of America. The consequences of world financial and economic crisis may become comparable, in terms of overall damage, to a large-scale use of military force”.⁹⁸ Threats to military security include: “the policies of several leading foreign countries, aimed at achieving overwhelming superiority in the military sphere”, primarily regarding strategic nuclear forces, and the development of high-technology means of warfare; “departure from international agreements in the fields of arms limitation and reduction”.⁹⁹ Threats to state and public security mostly match the threats stemming from the international relations situation (terrorism, nationalism, organized crime, etc.). I shall single out “investigative and other activity of special services and organizations of foreign countries, as well as individuals, aimed at inflicting damage to the security of the Russian Federation”.¹⁰⁰ In the field of border protection, the main threats are seen as: “the presence and possible escalation of armed conflicts” close to Russia’s borders; transnational terrorist and criminal activities.¹⁰¹ Threats in the fields of economy and technology are: lagging in development, dependence on foreign technology, a development model based on raw materials, dependence on foreign economic conditions, loss of control over resources, uneven regional development, corruption, and crime.¹⁰² One of the main threats in the field of health is drug addiction and alcoholism in population,¹⁰³ and in culture “dominance of production of mass culture oriented towards the spiritual needs of marginalized groups”.¹⁰⁴

This list of threats is absolutely in line with the inscription of the Russian identity boundaries. The Eurasian format of the state requires confronting numerous (both traditional and “new”) dangers to territorial integrity and state

⁹⁷ Ibid, II(10-12)..

⁹⁸ Ibid, II(12).

⁹⁹ Ibid, IV(1(30)).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, IV(2(37)).

¹⁰¹ Ibid, IV(2(41)).

¹⁰² Ibid, IV(3-5(47, 55, 64, 67)).

¹⁰³ Ibid, IV(6(72)).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, IV(7(80)).

borders. Proscribing negative consequences of globalization, nationalism, separatism, and religious radicalism stems from the concern about multinational character of the state, while cultural uniqueness does not tolerate mass culture. The pursuit of a strong and independent state reproduces along with the perception of danger of the national economy collapse and fall of the country into economic-technological-energetic dependency. Nevertheless, in the focus of the discourse are the dangers which threaten the Russian vision of international order and Russia's place in it. The aspirations of some countries to achieve military superiority, anti-missile defense plans of the United States, unilateral use of force, disagreements among the main actor of world politics, and especially the security architecture dominated by NATO, while the existing legal mechanisms have failed to prevent these developments — are seen as threats because they are elements of unipolarity which directly endangers Russia's status (important for its identity) of a great power capable of participating in the collective management of the world on an equal footing with other powers. Proscribing “marginal groups”, “nationalists and separatists”, “individuals” involved in “investigative activity” — is an example of internal exclusionary practice, for the above mentioned actors support the alternative models which are seen as dangerous for Russia's identity. This way they are equally threatening as foreign actors that can jeopardize Russia and its international status from the outside (above all NATO and the USA). Therefore, these groups' activities are linked with such foreign actors.

The Strategy of the United States says that “...there is not greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states”.¹⁰⁵ The United States is particularly vulnerable to asymmetrical threats, “such as those that target our reliance on space and cyberspace”.¹⁰⁶ Terrorism, natural disasters, cyber-attacks, and pandemics are seen as threats to homeland security.¹⁰⁷ The American Strategy, like the Russian, speaks about new threats stemming from the developments in the contemporary world (climate changes, energy dependence, financial crisis, crime, etc.), and about problems the United States face in each of the fields of national security (science, technology, health, etc.), while in economy — deficit is seen as the main threat (besides recession).¹⁰⁸ In this context, the following citation is also important: “An international architecture that was largely forged in the wake of World War II is buckling under the weight of new threats, making us less able to seize new

¹⁰⁵ *National Security Strategy*, op. cit, p. 4.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 17.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 18.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid*, p. 34.

opportunities”.¹⁰⁹ Which actors are identified as carriers of threats? Although the word “enemies” is used in the Strategy seven times, the concrete enemies are not listed explicitly. However, it can be concluded from the context that the enemies are non-state actors such as terrorist, extremist, and criminal groups, as well as states like Iran and North Korea; while for the great powers (such as Russia and China) the phrase “potential competitors” is reserved.¹¹⁰

Shorter list of threats that can directly jeopardize the territory and population of the United States, compared to the Russian Strategy, is a consequence of radically different spatial elements — relatively greater security of a state which was established in the New World, unlike the one which positioned itself at the Eurasian crossroads. Nevertheless, from the attitude towards global architecture we can see that the American sense of vulnerability is equal to, if not greater than the Russian one. Every deviation from the American vision of the world order can be characterized as a threat to global and U.S. security. This is the source of such a great concern with activities of “enemies” and “potential competitors”, for they are (at least the states) sovereign parts of this architecture, some of them (including Russia) even privileged by possessing the right of veto in the UN Security Council. Their “irresponsible behavior” (for example, the use of veto in UNSC against the will of the United States) is considered as a threat, for it incapacitates the existing architecture to deal with “new threats”. In fact, the problem is that the very existence of sovereign (independent) actors which offer alternative visions of world order is a threat to U.S. identity.

From the consideration of threats listed in the Strategies, it can be concluded that the United States and Russia see each other as a threat. Although none of them explicitly labels the other as its enemy, it is clear that Russia sees the U.S. behavior as the source of many dangers; while the United States sees the very existence of Russia as an independent great power as a danger. This kind of mutual threat logic indicates that the Strategies are nothing more but yet another stage in the reproduction of U.S. and Russia’s incompatible identities.

Means. Acquired values and the perception of threats require appropriate instruments for dealing with threats, i.e. protection of values. Besides, the appropriate choice of partners is needed. The following analysis will show that in the means that Russia and the United States envisage in the Strategies — there is a gap similar to the ones in values and threats.

When it comes to instruments, the Russian Strategy speaks of a “national security system”, which encompasses “forces and means”. Forces include the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 40.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 10.

bodies entitled to military service, and federal organs of state power which participate in the provision of security. Means include technological and other resources which in the framework of the national security system are used for collection, transmission and processing of information important to national security.¹¹¹ The Strategy envisages the use of national security forces in many areas which belong to national security. The armed forces reform is announced, but it is not explicitly determined what these forces will be used for, except for their role in the defense of territorial integrity and sovereignty mentioned in some point,¹¹² and their participation in conflict zones in accordance with international law at another.¹¹³ Nevertheless, the key instrument Russia intends to use to ensure its national security is “multi-vector diplomacy”, which should “broaden the possibilities for the Russian Federation to strengthen its influence on the world stage”.¹¹⁴ This diplomacy contains bilateral and, more importantly, multilateral relations with various partners. The Strategy is a bit stingy in enumerating partners — the primary importance is given to the CIS countries, the United States and the EU, while China, India, and Brazil are mentioned in the BRIC context. More attention is devoted to international organizations and other multilateral bodies, emphasizing that “Russia views the United Nations and the Security Council of the United Nations as a central element of a stable system of international relations”.¹¹⁵ With the United States, an equal strategic partnership “on the basis of shared interests” is desired, having in mind “*the key influence of Russian-American relations on the international situation as a whole*”.¹¹⁶ Regarding NATO, Russia wants to develop relations with it “on equal basis and in the interest of general security in the Euro-Atlantic region”, with a warning that these relations are determined by the Alliance’s plans to extend its military infrastructure towards Russia’s borders and to take over global functions contrary to international law, which is unacceptable for Russia. In the future these relations will depend on the Alliance’s readiness to recognize Russia’s legitimate interests, to respect international law, and to “seek the new tasks and functions with a humanist orientation”.¹¹⁷

Russia’s choice of the means for provision of national security is congruent with its vision of a multipolar international order based on international law and

¹¹¹ *Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года*, op. cit, I(6).

¹¹² *Ibid*, IV(1(29)).

¹¹³ *Ibid*, IV(9(93)).

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, II(9).

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, II(13).

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, II(18) (emphasis added).

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, II(17).

the principle of equal security for all, along with a pursuit of preserving territory and independence of a state with a vulnerable geographical position. The assessment that Russian-American relations have the key influence on the international situation as a whole means that authors of the Strategy do not see the United States only as a main threat, but as the main potential ally in establishing the desired world order. To transform from a threat to an ally of Russia, the United States have to respect legitimate Russian interests, which is no less than recognition of Russia's identity as described above. The U.S. Strategy speaks much more about the use of force. In the box titled "Use of force" it is written that "military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis". Force should always be the means of last resort, and be applied after careful calculation of costs and benefits. "The United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force".¹¹⁸ At another place it is claimed, nonetheless, that American leadership is "too narrowly identified with military force", so that "our enemies aim to overextend our Armed Forces and to drive wedges between us and those who share our interests".¹¹⁹ Therefore, the essence of American activities in terms of ensuring national security cannot be reduced to unilateralism; the Strategy gives much space to bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation with others. Unlike the Russian Strategy, the American Strategy gives a more detailed view of bilateral relations with various actors — from reinforcing the relations with allies who share values with the United States, over building the cooperation with "new centers of influence" on the basis of shared interests, to the engagement with enemy states in order to give them a chance to change their course.¹²⁰ This is an example of justifying the interference in the internal affairs of other states. Russia, which "has reemerged in the international arena as a strong voice", is seen as one of the new centers of influence.¹²¹ The United States should cooperate with it on the basis of mutual interests, especially when it comes to nuclear weapons. However, the Strategy does say that "the United States has an interest in a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia that respects international norms... We support efforts within Russia to promote the rule of law, accountable government, and universal values... we will support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors".¹²² Besides emphasizing the need to act multilaterally

¹¹⁸ *National Security Strategy*, op. cit, p. 22.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 18.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, pp. 3, 41–45.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, p. 8.

¹²² *Ibid*, p. 44.

“through a wide range of frameworks and coalitions”,¹²³ there is an implicit support for the concept of “coalitions of the willing”: “But when international forces are needed to respond to threats and keep the peace, we will work with international partners to ensure they are ready, able, and willing”.¹²⁴

The emphasis on unilateral action which includes the use of force when it is necessary, as well as the “coalition of the willing” concept, is in accordance with the American universalistic orientation which assumes that what is good for the United States is good for the world. Those who accept this are partners, and those who do not are punished by exclusion — either from the collective management (new centers of influence), or from the very order (enemies). However, this exclusion is not seen as permanent, but it lasts only until the actor in question changes according to American will, by U.S. interference in its internal affairs. As it is shown, the Strategy considers Russia as one of the actors whose change is desirable for the United States.

In conclusion, the Strategies of Russia and the United States envisage incompatible means of ensuring national security, which is congruent with the incompatibility in their respective values and threat perceptions. Full mutual understanding is impossible as long as Russia sees multilateral action as means of support to the multipolar system in which it would preserve its status of an independent great power, while the United States act as a threat to this vision of multilateralism by relying on unilateral (and through coalitions of the willing) use of force, at the same time aspiring to change their opponents (including Russia). Application of the means determined this way can only redraw the boundaries of the two countries’ incompatible identities and thwart their rapprochement, which has indeed happened in the recent period.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis of national security strategies of Russia and the United States shows that there is a total match between their contents in terms of basic values, perceived threats, and means of ensuring national security on the one hand, and incompatibilities of the two states’ identities listed in Table 2, on the other. The Strategies are just another stage in the performative reproduction of these countries’ respective identities, which assumes that Russia and the United States still see each other as a threat. The United States is still the power that sees its own purpose in construction of the new world order under the American leadership, and based on universal (in fact, American)

¹²³ Ibid, pp. 46-47.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 48.

values. Russia still insists on its status of an independent great power, which would participate in the collective management of the world on an equal footing with other powers, whilst preserving its own internal uniqueness. Despite the unquestionable results of the latest attempt of rapprochement between the two powers in 2009-2011 period, an interpretation (from the viewpoint of performative theory) of their national security strategies adopted in this period leads us to a conclusion that this process' briefness and incompleteness were quite expected outcomes. Establishing real partnership and friendly relations between Russia and the United States in the future would require changes in the discourse of danger, which would have to be expressed in their strategic documents in a way that does not assume their view of each other as a threat.

Is this possible unless at least one side forgoes its own identity in favor of the other? In my opinion, it is. Campbell's history of constitution and reproduction of U.S. identity shows that the list of American domestic and foreign enemies has changed over time; therefore, the expectation that Russia will remain a U.S. arch rival for eternity would be unfounded. On the other hand, despite its uniqueness, Russia still sees itself as a European power close to the West, while in the United States it finds the key potential ally for world management. For a successful rapprochement between Russia and the United States, it is necessary for them to find the basis of a common identity. This could happen if they would similarly react to some common threat which they view as more significant in the long run, rather than the threat they see in one another. Over time, the boundaries of this common identity would get fixed, while each of the sides would partly retain its unique features, but the new discourse (dominated by the new common threat) could make these unique features compatible. Whether that potential common threat comes from the challenge of China's rise, or from global environmental disasters, or from alien invasions — it is all the same. By analyzing the future strategic documents from the viewpoint of performative theory, it will be possible to anticipate the trend towards such an outcome.

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