UDC 327.8:355.02(470:73)
Biblid: 0543-3657, 75 (2024)
Vol. 75, No 1192, pp. 311-334
DOI: https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_ria.2024.75.1192.1

Original article
Received: 19 Jun 2024
Accepted: 02 Aug 2024
CC BY-SA 4.0

HISTORY OF THE EMPIRE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE OF RUSSIA: A REFLECTION ON MEARSHEIMER’S WORK ON UKRAINE

PEJIĆ Igor (Researcher, Strategic Research Institute, Belgrade, Serbia), igor.pejic@mod.gov.rs
SUBOTIĆ Milovan (Senior Research Fellow, Strategic Research Institute, Belgrade, Serbia), milovan.subotic@mod.gov.rs

In this paper, we examine the arguments presented by John Mearsheimer in his work on the Ukrainian crisis. Guided by the principles of neorealism, Mearsheimer fundamentally portrays Russia as a declining power forced to defend itself due to Washington’s reckless policies. Policies driven by liberal ideals rather than the principles of realpolitik led to NATO’s expansion into parts of Europe that constitute Russia’s sphere of interest, ultimately resulting in the conflict in Ukraine. While we agree with certain aspects of Mearsheimer’s work, we believe that specific deficiencies create a misleading picture of Russia and its policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Our analysis focuses on aspects of Russian history in these areas and the development of its strategic culture. Based on these foundations, we come to understand that Russian strategic culture is deeply rooted in its historical experience and largely adheres to principles of offensive strategy. Its policy in Ukraine, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, represents a historical continuity of Russian military activity, which is not a reaction to Washington’s policy but rather a part of a broader strategic culture and the way Moscow formulates foreign policy and perceives the international environment.

Keywords: International relations; Russia; strategy; strategic culture; United States.